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Physical Safety
Physical safety is a core task of government. It is neither surprising nor unreasonable 
for government to be held accountable for hazardous substances, for food safety, for 
flood protection, for the spread of infectious diseases, or for the risks involved in new 
technologies. 
In 2011 the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations asked the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (wrr) to investigate the scope for the development 
of a generic risk policy in relation to physical safety. Do citizens and businesses take 
sufficient responsibility for physical safety? Could the government assume a smaller 
role, and what part could the business community play in this? 
  
In this report the wrr argues that in order to answer these questions a distinction 
needs to be made between incidents, damage, risk and uncertainty. In addition, the 
wrr recommends that the thinking about responsibility for safety should not be 
placed in the perspective of a failing government, but that the central focus should be 
on the ambition of good governance. Finally, the wrr suggests that thinking about 
safety from the perspective of damage offers a useful framework for thinking through 
and reassessing the distribution of responsibilities. Responsibility for preventing, 
limiting and dealing with damage can only be assigned in advance, not retrospectively. 
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 foreword
The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (wrr) is an inde-
pendent advisory body for the Dutch government. Its position is governed by 
the Act Establishing a Scientific Council on Government Policy of 30 June 1976 
(Instellingswet wrr). The task of the wrr is to advise government on issues of 
importance for society. Unlike other advisory bodies in The Hague, the wrr is 
not tied to one policy sector. Rather, its reports go beyond individual sectors; 
they are concerned with the direction of government policy in the longer term.
This report was prepared by an internal wrr project group consisting of 
Professor Marjolein van Asselt (Council member and project group chair-
person), Professor André Knottnerus (Council chairperson) and Dr Peter de 
Goede (project coordinator). Dr Karin Ammerlaan made a major contribution 
to the section on damage arrangements. Interns Joris van Egmond and Jelle van 
Aanholt lent outstanding support to the project group. 
The project group discussed the topics covered in this report with the members 
of other advisory boards and with specialists in the fields of public administra-
tion, politics, science and scholarship, and business (insurance and law).The 
original report in Dutch provides a detailed list of the experts consulted. The 
wrr is grateful that they have been willing to share their knowledge and in-






1.1 responsibilit y for physical safet y 
Physical safety is a basic requirement for personal development and lays the 
foundation for prosperity and wellbeing. Thanks to many decades of govern-
ment intervention, the Netherlands has become a relatively safe country. As 
the outgoing Government made clear in the most recent Coalition Agreement 
(2010): “Safety is a central task of government”. In addition, government is 
obliged by the Dutch Constitution and international conventions1 to guarantee 
a certain level of safety and risk coverage. 
It is hence neither surprising nor unreasonable for the public to hold govern-
ment responsible for real or potential threats to and actual violations of physical 
safety. The public is justified in expecting a certain level of protection, and go-
vernment legitimacy may be threatened if it fails to live up to that expectation. 
It is possible, however, for the public to expect too much of government. 
Government obviously cannot guarantee absolute safety, nor can it be held res-
ponsible and accountable for every violation of physical safety. Physical safety 
results from the actions of many different parties, each one acting in accordance 
with its own logic and interests. They operate in complex chains and networks, 
often international ones, that are beyond the national government’s control. 
Government must depend on experts to size up threats, although it cannot 
trust their expertise blindly. Its ability to act is defined by such dependencies. 
Any discussion about government’s responsibility for physical safety must take 
this into account (wrr 2008). 
In addition, the democratic rule of law limits government’s ability to guarantee 
our physical safety. After all, the rule of law must never succumb to the pres-
sures that arise when attempting to guarantee safety: “The rule of law implies 
a subtle combination: state power is restricted on the one hand while power is 
exercised on the other, in order to safeguard individual freedoms and ensure 
that they have real meaning” (wrr 2002: 79). 
1.2  request for reflection
The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations2 has requested that the 
wrr should reflect on the topic of ‘risks and responsibilities’. His request 
should be seen in the light of an undertaking (made by his predecessor to the 
Dutch House of Representatives) to develop a strategic agenda for govern-
ment’s role in matters of risk. In 2011, the Organisation and Personnel Policy 
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Department for National Government, part of the Interior Ministry, launched 
the Risks and Responsibilities programme in that connection. This programme 
focuses on physical safety, a wide-ranging issue that touches on many diffe-
rent areas of policy and ministries, with major differences but also similarities 
between them.3 Physical safety is at issue when material and immaterial assets 
regarded as valuable by society are threatened by activities, trends, accidents 
and events that can be attributed primarily to natural or technological causes. 
These include epidemics, natural disasters, floods, hazardous substances, 
threats to food safety, transport accidents, major fires in public areas, accidents 
caused by construction flaws, and risks associated with new or existing techno-
logies, such as nuclear energy, CO2 storage and nanotechnology.
4 
The request for reflection refers to a ‘broadly supported’ problem definition: 
In recent decades, government has been held increasingly responsible for pro-
tecting the public and trade and industry against all manner of risk. When a 
new risk is exposed or after a serious accident, it is almost routine for the public 
and politicians to call for strict government measures to rule out that risk in 
future. Government often anticipates such responses and in doing so, inad-
vertently contributes to the idea that it is in fact society’s main safety net. That 
expectation then frequently ends in disappointment when government see-
mingly fails to live up to it. In many areas, the ‘risk-regulation reflex’ further-
more results in imbalances in public safety policy, with towering costs, ineffi-
cient use of government resources, a low return on the investment in safety, the 
violation of civil rights and other values, confusion as to responsibilities, and 
the obstruction of technological innovation and economic prosperity.
According to this request for reflection, the risk-regulation reflex is a ‘persis-
tent’ phenomenon that occupies a ‘prominent’ place in our society. The impres-
sion left by the request is one of a government that feels overstretched, overbur-
dened and overly sensitive. 
Specifically, the Interior Minister asked the wrr to reflect on two questions: 
1. How can government develop a general risk policy in which it plays a 
smaller role in avoiding and compensating for risks?
2. Are there reference points for dismantling existing mechanisms and brea-
king through barriers associated with both the risk-regulation reflex and 
the reflex in which the responsibility is laid squarely at the feet of govern-
ment?
The first question concerns policy principles and therefore considers what basic 
principles, rules, mechanisms and institutions are desirable. How can govern-
ment promote a balanced allocation of responsibility when it comes to physical 
safety? The second question is more concerned with the behavioural mecha-
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nisms and political phenomena behind the assumed reflexes. Both questions re-
fer to a difficult process in which government must weigh up different factors, 
for example between its own responsibility and solidarity, between fairness 
and reasonableness, or between safety and the freedom to act. There are no easy 
answers. The responsibility for physical safety is a balancing act. 
1.3 key concepts: incidents, damage, risks and uncertaint y  
The answers to the Minister’s questions call for conceptual clarity. When con-
cepts such as ‘risk’ and ‘incident’ are mentioned in the same breath, it becomes 
difficult to assess the nature and scale of the problem or the reference points for 
policy. In this document, we make a distinction between incidents, damage, 
risks and uncertainty. In other words, we differentiate between action leading 
to an actual violation of physical safety (incidents5), how the consequences of 
that action (damage) are dealt with, and how relatively known and undisputed 
threats to safety (risks) are handled, as well as the safety issues arising from 
faulty knowledge and/or conflicting values, for which we use the collective 
term ‘uncertainty’.6 
Incidents 
An incident is the actual violation of physical safety. We use this term as an 
overall concept to describe acute or rising emergencies within the realm of phy-
sical safety. They may be emergencies that, prior to their advent, were conside-
red more or less likely or unlikely to occur. However, the instant they do occur, 
the probability calculation becomes irrelevant. Until the eve of its occurrence, 
an incident can be referred to in terms of risk; after it takes place, it helps us to 
estimate the likeliness of similar incidents in future; while it is happening, ho-
wever, the danger is very real. The emphasis is therefore on how politicians and 
public administrators deal with actual physical unsafety and the damage that it 
causes. 
At its most basic, risk in fact involves the question of when, where and to what 
extent unopportunities possibilities (see textbox 1.1) will become reality. If 
there is uncertainty in these respects, then a further question is whether the 
threats will become reality at all. During an incident, the point is to combat the 
actual violation of physical safety. In cases of risk and uncertainty, the point 
is to weigh up the opportunities and threats. The aim of risk and uncertainty 
management is to prevent or limit incidents and damage or to anticipate them.7 





This document uses the terms ‘opportunities and threats’ as referred to in 
the wrr report Uncertain Safety (2008). This is a free translation of goede 
en kwade kansen, a concept that is difficult to translate literally. Here, it re-
fers to potential advantages and disadvantages, i.e. to the effects that may 
arise. It is used in the everyday sense, i.e. as the chance that something will 
have a favourable or unfavourable impact, and not as a  statistically calcu-
lable likelihood. The term opportunities and threats (i.e. goede en kwade 
kansen) is also used in a report by the National Institute for Public Health 
and the Environment (rivm) entitled Nuchter omgaan met risico’s [Dealing 
pragmatically with risks] (2003).8 Both reports refer to the archetypal pro-
position advanced by Wildavsky (1988) that innovation is never risk-free: 
the potential advantages and disadvantages must be viewed in relation to 
one another. Although Wildavsky does not use the terms opportunities and 
threats, Stallen (2002),9 who builds on Wildavsky’s ideas, does (goede en 
kwade kansen). 
The vocabulary of opportunities and threats is more common beyond the 
specific literature on risk. It is a familiar term in the field of bodily injury 
and liability, however. It can be traced back to the Dutch Civil Code, which 
contains the following passage: “The Court may wholly or partly postpone 
the assessment of damage which has not yet occurred or, after an evaluation 
of the opportunities and threats, make an anticipatory assessment” (italics 
added).10
Risks and uncertainty 
In our conceptual framework, risk is defined as a calculable safety problem – cal-
culable because the nature and scale of the potential danger, the probability of 
its occurring and its impacts are sufficiently known and undisputed. Risk can 
be expressed as the function of chance (probability) and consequence (impacts). 
The questions that public administrators and politicians face concern whether a 
risk is acceptable in the light of the associated opportunities, how the risk can be 
managed, and what role government should play in that scenario. 
There are also safety issues related to faulty knowledge and conflicting values. 
As a result:
–  there is a flawed understanding of the relationship between cause and effect 
(complex);
–  threats are conceivable but not indisputable (uncertain);
–  the effects are debatable and opinions vary as to what is and is not acceptable 
in normative terms (controversial11). 
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We use the collective term ‘uncertainty’ to refer to such threats to physical safe-
ty. It is important, then, to distinguish between uncertainty and unlikelihood 
(or improbability): complex, conceivable but unproved or disputed threats are 
not, by definition, unlikely. Indeed, faulty knowledge makes it impossible to 
say anything definite about likelihood. Those who see the two terms as equi-
valent have failed to take faulty knowledge and conflicting values seriously 
enough.
In situations of uncertainty, then, danger must be understood in the most fun-
damental sense of the word: the threat to physical safety, incidents and harmful 
impacts are conceivable but not indisputable. Examples include new techno-
logies, new infectious diseases, natural disasters caused by climate change, 
unprecedented problems within the context of food safety, and accidents invol-
ving hazardous substances. In cases of uncertainty, there is a fundamental basis 
of doubt regarding the need for policy, the reference points for that policy, and 
the policy framework. Uncertainty requires reflection, investigation, and an in-
depth dialogue with various parties about the opportunities and threats and, as 
a result, about the normative principles (wrr 2008). These are required before 
anything sensible can be said concerning the allocation of responsibilities and 
the policy to be pursued. Uncertainty therefore requires public administrators 
and politicians to consider how faulty knowledge and conflicting values should 
be handled.
	 Figure	1.1	 Risk-uncertainty	continuum	
The difference between calculable and incalculable threats is of vital signi-
ficance, but it is a gradual distinction and the dividing lines are blurred (see 
Figure 1.1). Controversy can easily arise as to whether the danger in question is 
sufficiently known and undisputed (risk), or whether it is uncertain, complex 
and/or controversial (uncertainty). We are therefore dealing with a conceptual 
distinction that draws explicit attention to faulty knowledge and conflicting 
values, and therefore to the normative and socio-psychological dimension of 












By making active use of investigation, dialogue, experience, and cumulative 
insight, we can transform uncertainty into calculable risks. Risks can therefore 
also be thought of as exceptional cases within the group of potential threats to 
physical safety (De Vries et al. 2011). But what may at first appear to be a calcu-
lable risk can also evolve into an uncertainty, for example because new parties 
that adhere to other values or have other insights join in the public debate. We 
must therefore accept that uncertainty is often an enduring factor in decision-
making. 
Damage
The term damage refers not to the moment (or momentum) of physical unsafe-
ty (the incident), but to the negative consequences of natural and technological 
activities, developments, accidents and events, both in the shorter and longer 
term. Damage may be material and immaterial; people, surroundings, and pri-
vate and public property can suffer damage in all sorts of ways. Damage is the 
physical manifestation for citizens, businesses and government of a violation of 
physical safety. The main challenge for public administrators and politicians is 
how to deal with damage (i.e. clearing up, settling claims, repairing, compensa-
ting). 
We regard damage as the focus of all responsibility-related questions. Issues 
concerning prevention, risk management and dealing with uncertainty can be 
linked to the urgent questions that arise in the case of incidents and damage. 
We have introduced the term ‘damage arrangements’ to refer to the full spec-
trum of measures and mechanisms intended to prevent, limit and cover da-
mage. This perspective gives us a basis for building a coherent view concerning 
the allocation of responsibility. It gives us a way of considering, retrospectively, 
how responsibility should be allocated in advance. In our view, the allocation of 
responsibilities is balanced if all the relevant parties are encouraged to prevent 
or at least to limit damage as much as possible, and if the necessary financial 
resources are made available to expedite damage control and management. 
1.4  interactions
Lumping incidents, damage, risk and uncertainty into a single category clouds 
our view of the various challenges facing politicians and public administrators 
and the appropriate reference points for re-evaluating the allocation of res-
ponsibility. The various ways in which we handle incidents, damage, risks and 
uncertainty do influence one another, however. 
Incidents can make it clear that we have failed to acknowledge certain risks and 
uncertainties, or that we have underestimated or disregarded them. We can 
hence learn a great deal from incidents. But if our concern for physical safety is 
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based exclusively on incidents, in particular on events that are unlikely to occur 
but would have a huge impact if they did, then we will end up merely ‘fighting 
yesterday’s battles’ (Versluis et al. 2010). Risk management and a sensible ap-
proach to uncertainty should ideally balance out the tendency to overreact after 
incidents. Conversely, the way we deal with incidents and damage may influ-
ence the context within which risk policy arises and the extent to which we can 
accept uncertainty. The way incidents are managed may encourage potential 
sources of damage to exercise risk management and to be proactive, leading to a 
more balanced allocation of roles. 
Incidents, damage, risk and uncertainty are therefore distinct dimensions of 
physical safety policy. Each dimension raises other political and administrative 
issues, but the way we deal with each one influences the way we deal with the 
others. That requires us to take a balanced and coherent approach to the various 
dimensions.
1.5  guide to this publication
Chapter 2 considers the risk-regulation reflex problem, i.e. the ‘conceptual 
framework’ applied within the context of the Risks and Responsibilities pro-
gramme. We argue that this discourse in fact centres on political and adminis-
trative conduct (or misconduct) in incidents. That is why we prefer the term 
‘incident-regulation reflex’ or simply ‘incident reflex’. 
Our conclusion is that, while politicians, public administrators and public 
servants see the incident-regulation reflex as a real phenomenon, there has, 
so far, been no empirical evidence to support that claim. In this document, we 
therefore propose a slightly different perspective: instead of demonstrating 
poor political and administrative conduct, we look at how to encourage good 
governance. We are therefore shifting the emphasis from the reason for legisla-
tion and regulations (the incident) to the purpose of policy (physical safety) and 
the way in which that purpose can be achieved (allocation of responsibility). 
The question of how to deal with potential threats to physical safety across the 
entire spectrum of risk and uncertainty – a fundamental question that is ne-
vertheless difficult to answer – moves front and centre. Chapter 3 presents five 
guidelines in this context and describes how they can be used in present-day 
policymaking. As our basis, we used the National Risk Assessment, carried 
out within the context of the National Safety and Security Strategy, and the 
Environment and Planning Act as amended by the Simply Better [Eenvoudig 
beter] operation. 
Chapter 4 considers how damage arrangements can provide a new perspective 
for reassessing the allocation of responsibility for physical safety. The purpose 
introduction 
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of damage arrangements is obviously to compensate for losses suffered, but 
they also offer positive or negative incentives to prevent incidents, limit dama-
ge, manage risk and reduce uncertainty. We outline a series of options that may 
help suppress a presumed tendency to automatically hold government respon-
sible (financially and otherwise) and at the same time improve safety. 
Chapter 5 summarises the insights that we have gained by investigating the 
various dimensions of safety (incidents, risks, uncertainty and damage). We 
reflect on the questions we have been asked concerning: 1) the possibility of de-
veloping a general policy focusing on a balanced allocation of responsibility and 
2) reference points for dealing with violations of physical safety within the poli-
tical and administrative context. We hope in this way to contribute to a broader 
discussion of physical safety and to policymaking in that field. We did not carry 
out all the necessary research ourselves. In Chapter 5, we therefore present the 
‘top three’ studies that we believe are necessary before the following step can be 
taken.
The wrr is a government-wide advisory body that concerns itself with long-
term policy. In this document, we therefore reflect on fundamental challenges 
of overarching concern or of interest to multiple ministries. The key issue is 
what the Dutch government can do on its own, allowing for the limits to its 
ability to act. The options outlined here can also be used to build an interna-
tional strategy that focuses on tackling challenges to physical safety within a 
European or international context. (For more details, please consult the wrr 
report (2010) Aan het buitenland gehecht.) 
Our reflections here are a synthesis of relevant wrr advisory reports12 that we 
have reconsidered and augmented by drawing on comments on the reports, 
recent literature, contributions and reports by other advisory bodies, contribu-
tions from current wrr projects (including Market, State and Society [Markt, 
staat en samenleving], The lessons of evaluations [Lessen van evaluaties], 
Supervision [Toezicht] and Confidence in the Citizen [Vertrouwen in de burger] 
and additional interviews. 
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notes
1  See, for example, Öneryildiz v. Turkije and Tatar v. Romenia at the European Court of 
Human Rights; see Ammerlaan (2009), De Hert (2011) and Spier (2011). 
2  Piet Hein Donner was the Dutch Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations from 14 
October 2010 to 6 December 2011. He is now the Vice-President of the Council of State.
3  In the Netherlands, a distinction is made between physical safety and ‘social’ safety, 
whereas internationally the distinction is between safety and security. Social safety – i.e. 
security – refers to defence, crime and terrorism. 
4  The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations also refers to this ‘forerunner’ in its 
Risks and Responsibilities project plan. This policy is also reflected in the lines of thought 
and terminology used in this document. 
5  And not security, where the damage is the result of malicious intent (terrorism, crime). 
Compare the definitions in Rob (2011), nifv Nibra (2008) and wrr (2008). 
6  In this document, we use the terms incident, crisis and disaster interchangeably. One can 
debate this choice, for example because the term ‘incident’ does insufficient justice to the 
systemic nature or causes of a threat to physical safety.
7  This categorisation has not been derived directly from the literature, as various experts 
have pointed out. There is broad agreement, however, that it is useful to distinguish be-
tween actual (incidents and damage) and potential (risks and uncertainty) violations of 
physical safety. The distinction between a violation of physical safety as a political and 
administrative instance (incident) and the question of damage (material and immaterial) 
is also acknowledged. There is furthermore general agreement that risks can be defined in 
two ways: narrowly (sufficiently known and undisputed to be expressed as the product 
of probability times impact) and broadly, with faulty knowledge and conflicting values 
playing a role. Risks are usually associated with calculable probabilities and impacts. We 
therefore use the term ‘uncertainty’ to describe complex, uncertain and controversial 
issues. At the same time, we emphasise that risks and uncertainty are points on a con-
tinuum. Our decision to use ‘uncertainty’ as a collective term is open to debate. Does it in 
fact improve on the distinction between simple, complex, uncertain and ambiguous risk 
(inspired by the work of the risk sociologist Ortwin Renn (2008); see also Aven and Renn 
(2010) and Van Asselt and Renn (2011)) that the wrr used in its report Uncertain Safety 
(2008) and was also applied by the Health Council of the Netherlands (2006; 2008)? We 
still regard the ‘old’ classification as useful, for those who prefer it. 
8  See also the widely used four-phase model: mitigation-preparedness-response-recovery, 
developed by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (fema). 
9   See also rmno (2004). This reference is also cited in rivm (2003) as justification for the 
use of opportunities and threats as terms. 
10  Section 6:105 of the Dutch Civil Code: Estimation of damage that has not yet revealed 
itself.
11  Uncertain Safety employed the term ‘ambiguous risks’; in the Government’s comments 
on this report (2 April 2009), this became ‘variably quantifiable risk problems’. Here, we 
prefer the term ‘controversial’. 
physical safety18
12  Including, in addition to Uncertain Safety (2008), Systemic Risks [Duurzame risico’s] 
(1994), Learning Government [Lerende overheid] (2006), iGovernment [iOverheid] (2011), 
the foresight studies Uit zicht (2010) and Het gezicht van de publieke zaak (2010), as well 
as the theme issue “Uncertainty, Precaution and Risk Governance” (Journal of Risk Re-
search 2011) published after a conference on risk and responsibilities co-organised by the 
wrr.
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2 dealing with incidents
2.1  risk-regulation reflex?
In the Minister’s request for reflection, he refers to the risk-regulation reflex, 
the conceptual framework for matters of physical safety. When a clear distinc-
tion is made between uncertainty, risks, incidents and damage, then the dis-
quiet expressed in the Minister’s questions clearly concerns how politicians and 
public administrators respond to incidents. At issue is how they respond when 
physical safety is actually violated, and not their response to risks.1 
Incidents are ‘critical moments’ in the political and administrative system in 
which the pattern of decision-making differs from the customary, rule-bound 
structures (cot 1998; Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001; Boin et al. 2005; 
Muller et al. 2009). Under the pretext that ‘necessity knows no law’, decision-
making may become more informal and may shift to higher governance levels; 
advisors (public officials or otherwise) may also gain a disproportional influen-
ce. Consensus and support for government action is coupled with polarisation 
and conflict. The ruling political and administrative classes are expected to act 
under enormous time pressure and in a turbulent environment to manage the 
incident. In the 1990s, the term ‘structural incidentalism’ was coined in this 
context (Rosenthal, Muller and Bruinsma, 1998). The former Vice President of 
the Netherlands Council of State, Herman Tjeenk Willink, described inciden-
talism as follows:
“There is no time to think: a response is needed, and without delay. Political con-
trol comes to depend on the media and their priorities. Journalists are regarded as 
the voice of the ‘disgruntled citizens’ (...) They set the tone for the political agenda 
and (subsequently) for governance in action” (Annual report of the Council of 
State 2003: 18, with the consent of person quoted in Rob 2011: 18).
The worry is that incidents in the political and administrative arena will lead to 
overreactions in legislation. The incident-regulation reflex (or simply incident 
reflex) is hence a better term for that worry than risk-regulation reflex. Can we 
spot an inherent pattern of political and administrative follow-up in the realm 
of physical safety? Is the incident reflex an empirical fact, or is it a hypothesis 
that has yet to be tested? Are we simply repeating what others have proposed, 
or is there solid empirical evidence? 
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2.2  perceived realit y
We live in a world dominated by the media. Politicians and public administra-
tors operate within a network in which the media (including the social media) 
play a larger role than ever before. Incidents are followed by a flood of media 
reports on those affected, the damage, the blame and the penalties exacted.2 
Enquiries are then launched, inspectors begin to dig, and/or the Dutch Safety 
Board springs into action.3 Some say that incidents are now always politicised, 
judicialised and mediatised4 or even that crises are exploited (Boin, McConnell 
and ’t Hart 2008; Boin, ’t Hart and McConnell 2009). Mediatisation always 
makes huge demands on the way those in charge communicate, but the stakes 
when incidents occur are higher now than ever; they are played out in many 
more arenas, and for many more audiences than in the past. The message con-
veyed by politicians and public administrators must be rational but also emotio-
nally persuasive, because it is no longer enough for them to merely invoke their 
formal position of authority.5
In our interviews with politicians, administrators and public servants, it be-
came clear that they feel moral and psychological pressure to take steps fol-
lowing an incident that will prevent similar incidents from happening in 
future. They are concerned about the incident reflex and feel it acutely. The 
more essayistic academic literature paints a particularly vivid picture of a go-
vernment that overreacts to incidents.6 Within the context of physical safety, 
the Bovenkarspel Legionellosis outbreak (1999) and the Enschede Fireworks 
Disaster (13 May 2000) are frequently cited instances when the incident reflex 
took place.7 The position taken in the Risks and Responsibilities programme and 
the request for reflection acknowledges this perceived reality, as does the fol-
lowing recommendation, made in a recent study by the scientific bureau of the 
Christian Democratic Appeal (cda):8
“Have a cooling-off period after an incident. Keep your cool when incidents occur. 
Too often the follow-up is to produce more rules, whereas the problem is not a 
systemic one but rather a one-off incident or a symptom. To reduce the chance of 
hasty decision-making, there ought to be a cooling-off period of six months after 
incidents occur to give the emotions of the moment a chance to die down” (p. 101).
Reflex is viewed unilaterally as something negative in this context, not only as 
hasty but also as an inexpedient or even foolish reaction. However, the author 
who coined the term risk-regulation reflex has pointed out that it is in fact a 
positive, activistic reflex to which our culture owes many of its virtues, such 
as a historically unprecedented level of physical safety.9 In biology as well, 
every reflex has a purpose. An organism’s chance of survival depends in part 
on its ability to react quickly to real or potential disruption. According to the 
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Voorhoeve Committee, safety policy can learn lessons from biology:10 
“An organism’s defence against internal and external threats is a highly refined 
and complex system that wards off threats and repairs itself. All organs contribute 
to the fight for survival (...) The key to the defence system is its ability to track 
down threatening elements at an early stage ... Public administration and the state 
apparatus should base their policy on an ‘immunological’ concept”(Voorhoeve 
Committee 2005: 13). 
Viewed from this vantage point, government responds to stimuli in the form of 
actual violations of or presumed threats to physical violence because it needs to 
learn. Comparing its response to the biological one shows that the reflex itself 
is not necessarily the problem; it is the proportionality of the reaction that is at 
issue. If the political and administrative defence system runs riot, then it will 
turn against society. But there is also something wrong if the political and ad-
ministrative system fails to react at all after a serious safety incident. 
2.3  lack of evidence
Has the incident reflex been established as an empirical fact in the domain of 
physical safety? Publications that ‘demonstrate’ the incident reflex mainly 
examine Anglo-American political systems.11 Political, social and cultural dif-
ferences (which may also lead to any threats to or violations of physical safety 
being appreciated differently)12 mean that their conclusions may not be entirely 
relevant to the Dutch situation. Publications by Dutch researchers on the pre-
sumed incident reflex are too anecdotal and essayistic in nature, in our view. 
Although the Netherlands has a sound tradition of crisis research, with Dutch 
scholars such as Uri Rosenthal, Mark Bovens, Paul ’t Hart and Arjen Boin 
playing an authoritative role, social scientists in the Netherlands have conduc-
ted little research on the political and administrative follow-up to incidents. 
Even major incidents – the catastrophic floods that struck the Netherlands 
in 1952, the Bijlmer Aviation Disaster in 1992, and the Enschede Fireworks 
Disaster in 2000 – have not been studied in that particular way. Crisis research 
has focused instead on crisis management, on lessons learned in crises and on 
political accountability. 
Indeed, the very idea of an incident reflex could simply be a short-sighted in-
terpretation of the political and administrative commotion that ensued after a 
small number of incidents. The incident-regulation reflex discourse fits right in 
with a climate in which government is suspected, almost automatically, of ma-
licious acts or omissions without there being any proof. That is something that 
we do not wish to agree or contribute to without proper evidence. No one will 
deny that after the Enschede Fireworks Disaster, the then Minister of Housing, 
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Spatial Planning and Environment, Jan Pronk, took up the question of stricter 
regulation, which was then relaxed again after a while. The question, however, 
is whether this example is iconic or exceptional. We can counterbalance the 
picture that emerges from the somewhat unrealistic legislation following the 
fireworks disaster13 with examples of more level-headed responses. In fact, 
Prime Minister Mark Rutte issued an explicit warning against the incident 
reflex during a press conference addressing, among other things, the Van Dijk 
Committee’s report on Q fever (caused by the Coxiella burnetti bacterium):
“… One must learn from the past, but as politicians, one must be cautious not to 
be too eager to respond to an incident or disaster with new policies or new regu-
lations. At a certain point, it’s better to simply observe: something went wrong, 
we have to find out what went wrong, and draw lessons from it. Such lessons are 
more cultural in nature – how to work as a team – than exclusively procedural. 
If only it was a mere question of procedure. We wouldn’t need politics then.” 
(Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte at a press conference on 26 November 2010.) 
After the Moerdijk Chemicals Fire (5 January 2011), the Dutch House of 
Representatives did request an emergency debate, but that is not a dispropor-
tionate reaction in itself.14 During the debate, the House adopted a motion 
asking for a quick scan to be carried out of locations at risk of similar fires and 
whether the relevant crisis plans and enforcement measures were in order. The 
companies surveyed were high-risk ones (coming under the Decree on Major 
Accident Hazards, brzo) and businesses that store large quantities of one or 
more hazardous substances (coming under the highest level of protection wit-
hin the Dutch pgs directive).15 A survey of this kind seems to be a useful reflex.
There are also examples of incidents that did not lead to legislation being amen-
ded in any way or to policy interventions. In 2002, during a drawn-out political 
discussion of the Hercules airplane crash16 (1996), it was observed that Dutch 
airports had not had much experience or built up much knowledge of how to 
handle aviation accidents.17 Hercules aircraft were also still carrying passengers, 
whereas it had been recommended that they cease doing so. Passenger trans-
port in cargo planes was also contrary to international aviation rules. In other 
words, there are indications that the incident reflex does exist, but there are also 
counter-indications. 
Research shows that the Dutch rulebook has grown by approximately two per 
cent per annum in the past thirty years (wodc 2009).18Annual output of rules 
and regulations is relatively consistent over time (and the various ministries 
differ in that respect). Reactions to incidents are also only one of the possible 
causes of the regulatory burden.19 There is no evidence that the way the political 
and administrative system deals with incidents is the most important or most 
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decisive factor in that respect. Nevertheless, incidents have had an enormous 
knock-on effect in the legislation and regulations applicable in certain sectors. 
The most obvious example, however – the Netherlands counterterrorism po-
licy after 9/11 – falls within the context of security.20
No one denies that an incident can spark off a busy period for public admi-
nistrators, politicians and public servants and put them under considerable 
pressure. It may well keep them occupied ‘full time’. The question, however, 
is whether incidents consistently result in over-regulation. Investigation com-
mittees make it seem (unintentionally) as if incidents are avoidable and gover-
nment is culpable (Van Eeten 2011), but the impetus to produce legislation and 
regulations need not be sought there. An internal enquiry by the Dutch Safety 
Board (an independent body) shows that most recommendations by far do 
not refer to legislation or changes in legislation.21 The independent commit-
tees that held enquiries into the Enschede Fireworks Disaster (2000) (Oosting 
Committee) and the Volendam New Year’s Eve Fire (2001) that claimed 14 lives 
(Alders Committee) did not ask for new rules but instead expressed concern 
about flawed supervision and a lack of enforcement. The general thrust of crisis 
evaluations appears to assume that it would be enough to enforce the existing 
rules, and that new rules are unnecessary. 
Because there is so little in-depth empirical research into the political and ad-
ministrative follow-up to incidents, the question is what value the examples 
have. Which ones are exceptions, and which ones are representative? Is there 
a pattern? Do ‘critical moments’ result in excessive rules and regulations, as 
assumed in the debate concerning the incident reflex? Or is there another pat-
tern visible in the way incidents are actually dealt with, at least in the domain 
of physical safety? Does the initial commotion perhaps die down? Since there 
is no valid evidence based on empirical research, the incident reflex remains, at 
least for the time being, a hypothesis that has yet to be tested.
2.4  tilting the perspective towards good governance 
The Risks and Responsibilities programme takes the presumed incident-regu-
lation reflex as its starting point. That means that its perspective is basically 
dominated by the idea of ‘bad’ governance. We propose tilting that perspec-
tive towards ‘good’ governance. Is it possible to describe what behaviour is 
characteristic of good governance when incidents occur? Are there good and 
best practices? How can we use them as examples, so that the emphasis is on 
encouraging good governance? We can examine this approach in various ways: 
by studying follow-ups to incidents, mining the political and administrative 
lessons learned, and developing a modus operandus that takes the expectations 
of citizens into account.
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Studying follow-ups to incidents
One recommendation is to commence empirical comparative research in the 
social sciences on the political and administrative follow-up to incidents. The 
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences22 (2011) has made this point 
in its most recent research agenda, in particular under the heading ‘resilient 
governance’.23 How have politicians and public administrators responded to 
incidents in the first instance? Is there a pattern in the way they respond? What 
policy interventions have been proposed with reference to an incident? What 
policy interventions were ultimately put into place and what positive or nega-
tive effects have they had? What proposed interventions were not put into ef-
fect or were cancelled relatively quickly? Which lessons have and have not been 
learned? If patterns of action/non-action and learning/non-learning can be 
identified, how can they be explained? Answering these questions would pro-
vide an empirical basis for describing what good governance means and what it 
requires following an incident. 
Mining the political and administrative lessons learned
Complementing the foregoing, we recommend that the system mine the va-
rious political and administrative lessons learned.24 Why is it so difficult for 
public administrators and politicians to deal effectively with incidents, inclu-
ding those in the domain of physical safety? How can they avoid the pitfall 
of the incident reflex while at the same time drawing lessons from incidents? 
Systematically mining the lessons they have already learned would provide a 
sound basis for developing practical governance tools that can be applied in the 
event of incidents. 
Developing a modus operandus that allows for citizens’ expectations 
Politicians and public administrators seem hesitant to admit that they are inca-
pable of solving every problem, that government cannot live up to every expec-
tation, and that people also bear responsibility for making something of their 
lives (Rob 2010: 35). Their hesitation is basically a reluctance to confess to the 
limits of their power and of their own grasp of reality. 
But the question is whether the expectations that citizens have of their govern-
ment are in fact realistic. According to essayists who have explored the culture 
of fear and the precautionary principle, Western society is unable to accept 
that misfortune is simply part of life; it is obsessed by ‘safety at any price’ and 
demands that government do everything possible to protect it.25 Citizens are 
said to expect ‘a safety utopia’ (Boutellier, 2004). However, we are not aware of 
any survey that directly addresses the public’s expectations regarding physical 
safety or confirms that it has a ‘safety reflex’ whereby it automatically holds go-
vernment responsible.26 In other words, there is once again no solid empirical 
evidence for this reflex. Simply believing that such a reflex exists can have very 
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real consequences, however, because that belief influences the way government 
thinks and acts: politicians, public administrators and public servants can let 
themselves be influenced by expectations about expectations.
Is it possible to develop a realistic modus operandus that allows for the fact that 
government is restricted in its ability to act and takes into account that misfor-
tune and fate are an unavoidable part of human existence (tragic as that may 
be)?27 If we view things from this perspective, then we should avoid statements 
such as ‘never again’ and instead seek to frame events in a way that acknow-
ledges people’s emotions but does not give rise to any false expectations (see 
Rob 2011: 70; Ammerlaan 2009). Victims are generally resilient people who 
are capable of taking care of themselves. They are normal people in abnormal 
circumstances. How can we help them in a way that allows them to get on with 
their lives? How can we prevent the follow-up from once more casting them in 
the role of victim? What is important to them? What do they want? Victims are 
not, by definition, only out to get money.28 
2.5  conclusion
It is not always possible to avoid incidents. Anyone banking on the benefits of 
risk-taking must realise that threats can also become reality, despite all the ef-
fort devoted to damage limitation and risk management. Not every tightrope 
act ends well. Does it make sense to focus on incidents as we consider how best 
to allocate responsibility for physical safety? Emphasising the incident reflex29 
puts too much emphasis on preventing incident-driven legislation and regula-
tions. 
If we tilt the perspective towards encouraging good governance, then we are 
no longer focusing on the reason for such legislation (incidents); instead, we 
have shifted the emphasis to the purpose of policy (physical safety) and the 
way in which that purpose can be achieved (a balanced allocation of responsi-
bility). How can government assume its share of the responsibility for physical 
safety, both owing to the legal obligations placed on it and the need for collec-
tive mechanisms? How can it also ensure that citizens and businesses assume 
their share of the responsibility (and are capable of doing so)? The focus is thus 
on risks and uncertainty as a reference point for how we think about physical 
safety and government responsibility. In the next chapter we will consider basic 
principles for dealing with risks and uncertainty and reflect on current policy-
making from this perspective.
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notes
1  This document will not cover political and administrative trials and tribulations 
during incidents, or only in passing. For a more detailed treatment, see ’t Hart and 
Rosenthal (1990).
2  Including Beunders (2002), Vasterman (2004), Tiggeloven (2005). 
3  The wrr project Lessen van evaluaties [What evaluations can teach us] looks specifi-
cally at crisis evaluation as a political and administrative phenomenon and its political 
and administrative significance. 
4  See Muller, Rosenthal, Helsloot and Van Dijkman for this (2009).
5  Versteeg and Hajer (2010) and Hajer (2009). For a discussion of the importance of 
‘rhetorical frames’, see De Bruijn (2011).
6  Van Twist et al. (2010) and Boutellier (2005, 2011).
7  Van Tol et al. (2011).
8  The Christian Democratic Appeal (cda) is a centrist political party. It has its own 
scientific advisory council. It is currently one of the parties that make up the outgoing 
coalition centre-right minority Government, along with the People’s Party for Free-
dom and Democracy (vvd). The Government was supported by the right-wing Party 
for Freedom (pvv). The prime minister, Mark Rutte, and his Government resigned in 
April 2012 after the coalition partners failed to reach agreement on austerity measures.
9  Trappenburg (2011: 44).
10  Commissie Geïntegreerd buitenlands beleid [Committee on Integrated Foreign Policy] 
(2005). Wildavsky (1988) drew the same comparison in his influential book Searching 
for Safety.
11  See for example, Risk and Regulation Advisory Council (2009).
12  See, for example, Renn and Rohrmann (2000) for cross-cultural studies that reveal 
national differences in attitudes towards danger. 
13  This is not the only follow-up. The fireworks disaster led to a Directorate of External 
Safety being established at the then Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Envi-
ronment, and to the installation of an Advisory Council on Hazardous Substances and 
a National Expertise Centre for External Safety. 
14  The fire at the Chemie-Pack plant (in Moerdijk) on 5 January 2011 caused great concern 
because the plant stored thousands of litres of carcinogenic materials. The toxic fumes 
became a public health threat when the smoke cloud drifted to a nearby city. 
15  The Dutch pgs directives are based on the seveso Directives. The Seveso II Direc-
tive 96/82/ec was extended by Directive 2003/105/ec of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 December 2003 amending Council Directive 96/82/EC. The 
latter was established to cover risks arising from storage and processing activities in 
mining, from pyrotechnic and explosive substances, and from the storage of ammo-
nium nitrate and ammonium nitrate-based fertilisers.
16  The Hercules crash on 15 July 1996 was an aviation disaster in which 34 passengers 
died. 
17  See Van Duin (2001). 
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18  De Jong and Zijlstra (2009). 
19  Other possible causes are the demand for control, bureaucratisation, the demand for 
regulatory equality, and the quest for support and internationalisation. See for exam-
ple the Bruikbare Rechtsorde [A practicable system of law] programme (2006a, b). 
20  See the report by the Commissie Evaluatie antiterrorismebeleid [Evaluation Committee 
for Counter-terrorism Policy] (Suyver Committee) (2009).
21  Joustra, personal communication.
22  The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences was founded in 1808 as an advi-
sory body to the Dutch Government. 
23  It has asked the following questions, which merit further study and overlap with 
the questions we have posed to some extent: How should public servants and public 
administrators deal with an ‘angry public’? Are there significant differences in the ef-
fectiveness with which government authorities and sectors respond to crises? Which 
institutional designs and leadership practices promote and which impede the robust-
ness and reliability of public organisations in taking action against major threats and 
crises?
24  The Dutch Council for Public Administration can play a role in this. The Council al-
ready focused on the politics of incidents in an earlier report (Veiligheid en Vertrouwen) 
on security, where it stated that the incident management requires calmness of politi-
cians (who should refrain from opportunistic behaviour), of the media (which should 
avoid dramatising events) and of citizens (who should reserve judgement and not be 
overwhelmed by the media assault).
25  See, for example, Sunstein (2005), Furedi (2006), Bauman (2006) and Pieterman 
(2008). 
26  Conclusions concerning citizens’ expectations are based mainly on risk perception 
research and post-incident media discussions. Research has been conducted into 
the perceptions of citizens regarding specific risks (Netherlands Institute for Social 
Research 2010) or their general views on the principle that they bear responsibility 
for themselves, in relation to the existing or expected responsibilities of govern-
ment (Netherlands Institute for Social Research 2011), but so far no research has been 
conducted into their specific views on the allocation of responsibilities in the area of 
physical safety. The programme launched by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations, Risks and Responsibilities, provides for research on the public’s 
expectations concerning physical safety and their views on the allocation of respon-
sibility. The Dutch Council for Social Development (rmo) has recently collaborated 
with the Netherlands Institute for Social Research on a study investigating fear and 
distress. 
27  See De Mul (2006), Van Eeten (2011) and Drenth von Februar (2005).
28  Ammerlaan (2009) distinguishes the following needs, which can be met (at least in 
part) by government: receipt of disaster aid and shelter, access to information, receipt 
of immaterial support and practical help, recognition/acknowledgement, recoup of 
financial losses, truth finding, accountability by parties responsible, apologies from 
those responsible, drawing lessons from the event in order to prevent recurrence, pro-
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cedural needs (access to justice or a neutral decision-maker, procedural information). 
See also Relis (2007), Boom et al. (2008) and Hadfield (2008).
29  It could be said, on the other hand, that the Risks and Responsibilities programme is 
also about risk as an impetus for legislation and rule-making. The idea is that as soon 
as a risk has been identified, the political and administrative response would be to 
enact legislation and make rules to cover that risk. If incidents serve to expose risks, 
then our thinking on the incident-reflection reflex applies. If risks become an issue 
of public debate for some other reason, then there may well be some commotion in 
administrative circles, but the impression that emerges both in the literature and in 
interviews that we have conducted is that it is in no way comparable to the political 
and administrative uproar that ensues after an incident. As a result, in this document 
we consider the incident-regulation reflex as the ‘hardest case’. As there is no evidence 
for it, we refrain here from examining the notion that impulsive legislation and regula-
tions come about when risks are identified by means other than incidents. 
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3 risks and uncertaint y
3.1  fundamental political appraisal
How can government take charge of its responsibility in the event of potential 
threats to physical safety? Policy intended to manage risk and uncertainty calls 
on politicians and public administrators to undertake a difficult appraisal. After 
all, high-risk and uncertain activities can also offer society advantages, otherwi-
se we would probably not engage in them. The responsibility for physical safety 
forces us to consider the opportunities and threats and weigh them against each 
other (Chapter 1). Do the potential advantages weigh up against the possible 
disadvantages? Which hazards are personal matters, and which ones require 
collective mechanisms?1 Underpinning these questions is a fundamental pro-
cess of political appraisal that weighs up the short term against the long term, 
individual responsibility against solidarity, reasonableness against fairness, and 
the collective interest against the individual’s freedom to act. The responsibility 
for physical safety is thus a balancing act. 
Experts, citizens and businesses assess real or potential threats to physical 
safety in different ways. Such differences are often manifestations of more un-
derlying value conflicts (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Schwarz and Thompson 
1990; Thompson et al. 1990; wrr 1994). Another factor when assessing dan-
ger is the level of trust in the authorities and in the policy-making process, as 
well as the way in which the media depict the threats (Pidgeon et al. 2003). 
Differences in estimates and assessments are often a crucial component in safe-
ty issues. The challenge is to find a balance within the political arena between 
all the various risk estimates and actual knowledge of dangers while allowing 
for conflicting values and faulty knowledge. Anyone who takes refuge in sci-
entific risk assessments or does not allow for the way they are entrenched in 
society is not doing justice to the public’s perceptions and is therefore throwing 
oil on the fire (Jasanoff 2006). The relationship to science must therefore also be 
evenly balanced.
In order to explore the possibility of a general policy focusing on real or poten-
tial threats to physical safety (the Minister’s first question, see Chapter 1), we 
concentrate in this chapter on basic principles for dealing with risk (sufficiently 
known and undisputed) and uncertainty (faulty knowledge and/or conflicting 
values).2 Our point of departure is that, although safety is an undisputed public 
interest that is enshrined in the law, the specific process of weighing up oppor-
tunities and threats is necessarily political in nature. It is important to recognise 
this. The political nature of that process should not be organised into oblivion 
by developing technocratic mechanisms that give the experts the overhand. 
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While a knowledge of potential threats (based on practical lessons learned in 
the present and past and on scientific insights into relevant causal relationships) 
is useful and necessary, the trick is to help politicians carry out an informed 
appraisal that can (or perhaps must) also allow for the public’s perceptions 
(Asveld and Roeser 2009). 
What guidelines for general policymaking can we offer government based on 
scientifically informed reflection? We have arrived at five guidelines or refe-
rence points:
–  intertwine opportunities and threats;
–  make allowance for the social and psychological properties of danger;
–  utilise risk comparisons; 
–  accept uncertainty;
–  organise the way uncertainty is dealt with.
3.2 intertwine opportunities and threats
Policy focusing on risk and uncertainty requires opportunities and threats to 
be weighed up with great care; in other words, that process must consider gains 
and losses, advantages and disadvantages, usefulness and necessity. Often, ho-
wever, opportunities and threats are raised and discussed at different times and 
in different places, in different arenas, with different parties and by different 
means. Political and administrative discussions of innovation often take place 
separately from discussions of physical safety, both temporally and location-
wise. That means that both discussions become unilateral in nature, with blind 
enthusiasm concerning the outside chances weighing up against a unilateral 
fixation on danger. Opportunities and threats are scarcely weighed up in either 
discourse, if at all. That means that dossiers can easily become polarised and 
stagnant, making it even more difficult to take sensible steps. It would be ad-
visable to seek ways of linking the separate political and administrative apprai-
sals of opportunities and threats at an early stage, in the interests of symmetry 
and in an effort to keep polarisation at bay.
In decision-making, a reference to the advantages may lead to uncertain dan-
gers being accepted, either implicitly or explicitly, for example because it is 
simply impossible or undesirable to exclude uncertain threats (too expensive, 
takes up too much space). The risk-based approach3 implies that physical safety 
will in fact be violated at some point. The approach taken to incidents (Chapter 
2) and damage arrangements (Chapter 4) are therefore necessary complements 
for a policy that focuses on risks and uncertainty. However, government must 
then cope with (and be able to cope with) potential violations of physical safety 
that should always be factored into any calculation of opportunities. The aim is 
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to find a balance between the opportunities and the cost (in the broadest sense 
of the word) of prevention and preparation. How is the responsibility for those 
costs allocated? That question is the focus of Chapter 4. 
3.3  make allowance for the social and psychological 
properties of danger
Social and psychological research into risk perception (Slovic, 2000, 2010; see, 
for example, Van Asselt (2000) and Niemeijer and Van Wijck (2007) for syn-
theses) shows that, in addition to estimating the probability of danger and cal-
culating its impacts in quantitative terms, we must also acknowledge the major 
role played by the qualitative properties of danger. Such research has revealed 
that public acceptance depends on whether the potential danger is due to na-
tural causes or human activity. Another factor is whether the balance between 
opportunities and threats is irreversible. Is there a way back? In addition, the 
degree of choice is important: can people choose to expose themselves to the 
danger, or has that choice been made for them? There are therefore grounds to 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary risks in the political appraisal 
process. If exposure is involuntary, the public expects the collective – i.e. gover-
nment – to offer it a higher level of protection. 
Another key factor is whether the causes and possible consequences are familiar 
and known or more intangible and deterring. An increase in the risk of cancer 
falls into the latter category, for example. The nature and potential consequen-
ces of the danger are therefore also very important. Are they manageable? What 
modus operandus applies if things go wrong? Has something similar gone 
wrong in the past? In other words, is there an accident history? Is there a po-
tential for catastrophe, in the sense that the danger could lead to the disruption 
of society? Another significant factor is the impact that such dangers have, or 
could have, on future generations (children and the ability to have children). 
The final factor is the degree of fairness. Are the potential victims the same 
people who enjoy the advantages of the opportunities? Factors that must be 
allowed for in this respect are the geographical, social and economic, and demo-
graphic differences in risk exposure, vulnerability, self-reliance and insurability. 
One example is the Rijnmond region of the Netherlands, where there is an ac-
cretion of risk. Wealthier and more educated citizens are generally better equip-
ped to ensure themselves of a relatively safe environment.4 In contrast, citizens 
with a lower social and economic status, the elderly, children and the infirm 
must be regarded as potentially more vulnerable (see also Kruize 2007). In other 
words, in questions of physical safety, dividing lines may exist or open up in 
society that can be decreased or even increased by policy. 
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Risk issues therefore encompass fundamental political questions even if they 
do not involve conflicting values and faulty knowledge. Depending on the 
combination of properties, some threats will loom larger in the public debate 
than one would expect purely on the basis of their probability and impacts (if 
the risks are sufficiently known), whereas other types of danger are not deemed 
as serious as they appear to be based on quantitative risk calculations. All of 
this plays a role in the political decision-making process concerning the role of 
government. That means that we must also analyse the social and psychological 
properties of real or potential threats.5 It is then up to politicians and public ad-
ministrators to communicate about these social and psychological dimensions 
(and to dare to do so). 
3.4  utilise risk comparisons
Comparisons of potential threats that allow for the foregoing properties can 
be useful because they help place specific threats into a broader context. Risk 
comparisons offer a basis for a more general consideration of policymaking 
concerning real and potential threats. Risks and uncertainties are often dealt 
with in isolation in the everyday reality of political and administrative decisi-
on-making. Multidimensional comparisons of dangers may well give public 
administrators and politicians building blocks for weighing up and substantia-
ting opportunities and threats. A risk comparison is thus a useful ‘exercise’ for 
politicians and public administrators, but ultimately, the appraisal process is a 
political one. 
At the same time, we wish to stress that the idea of an ironclad quantitative 
appraisal framework for developing and testing all physical safety policy is an 
illusion, and one that has long been dispelled. It assumes that all safety issues 
are sufficiently known and undisputed and similar enough to measure with the 
same yardstick. However, this view does not take the widely differing proper-
ties of risk into account (voluntary versus involuntary, natural causes versus 
human activity, manageable versus unmanageable, etc.) or the types of damage 
that may ensue (death and injury versus ecological damage, property damage 
versus cultural and historical damage, material versus immaterial damage, 
acute social disruption versus creeping long-term impacts). Uncertainty plays 
no role in this context (i.e. ‘unlikely’ or ‘unimportant’). Faulty knowledge and 
conflicting values are denied. 
Underlying the single-yardstick approach is the faulty notion that major dama-
ge is, by definition, the result of a major risk. Our increasingly interdependent 
world, however, means that serious incidents are often the result of an accretion 
of relatively small risks. Even if risks could be measured with a single, undis-
puted risk yardstick, then, the question is what impact this would have on po-
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licymaking. The idea of simple decision-making rules based on a universal risk 
yardstick is an illusion that the literature and reports by various advisory bodies 
have long since dispelled.6 
A report by the Health Council of the Netherlands concerning Legionnaires’ 
disease (2003) is a good example. In 1999, an outbreak of Legionellosis at a 
flower show in the Netherlands affected 188 visitors and exhibitors and led to 
28 deaths. Estimates of the quantity of legionella bacteria present at the show 
exceeded existing standards for infection, illness and death. The Health Council 
then compared the health benefit per euro of legionella-prevention measures 
(which would require a significant investment in the water supply system) 
with other public health measures. The comparison showed that legionella 
prevention is in fact relatively expensive. The Council therefore recommended 
that other factors should be allowed for in political decision-making, such as 
the impact of preventive measures on environmental policy, and the social 
and psychological properties of the risk (the cause is specific and more or less 
technical in nature, the consequences are deterring, and a sudden outbreak 
of Legionnaires’ disease is relatively difficult to control). A single yardstick 
(Quality Adjusted Life Year or qaly) would therefore not be enough to arrive 
at a well-balanced decision. The Council’s report offers a good example of sen-
sible risk comparison, in which the quantitative cost-benefit analysis also consi-
ders the social acceptability or unacceptability of the threat to physical safety.
Risk comparisons make it possible to group threats by different properties and 
to consider, for each separate group, the underlying policy principles, the po-
tential role of government, citizens and businesses, and even the most effective 
strategies per cluster of threats. Instead of thinking about policy at an extremely 
high level of aggregation, risk comparisons make it possible to find the right 
balance between the general and the specific. Are risks (and uncertainties) that 
resemble one another on various dimensions really treated differently? And 
if so, why do the relevant practices differ so much? Are there good reasons for 
treating them differently? If not, how can the differences be removed? Policy 
comparisons7 of this kind can lead to bottom-up rules of thumb and good prac-
tices for dealing with potential violations of physical safety.
3.5  accept uncertaint y – and the responsibilit y for 
uncertaint y 
To accept uncertainty means to accept the problems of faulty knowledge and 
conflicting values and how they manifest themselves in attitudes and behavi-
our. However, uncertainty refers to safety issues that lie outside the comfort 
zone. They require a willingness to recognise and acknowledge uncertainty 
(faulty knowledge and conflicting values) and to identify them as such. 
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Uncertainty is uncomfortable, certainly in Western cultures. No one wants 
uncertainty. It describes an emotional state diametrically opposed to the 
Western ideals of self-assurance, control and effectiveness. This is why it is dif-
ficult to openly acknowledge and accept uncertainty. But societies that innovate 
are themselves generating uncertainty. Innovation opens the door to a world 
that differs from the one that we all know and trust. Uncertainty is therefore 
also a product of human activity. 
Why should government take responsibility for uncertainty? The reluctance to 
advise government to do so is very tangible in some publications.8 And indeed, 
assigning government yet more responsibility appears to conflict with ideas 
about scaling back government’s role in physical safety issues. 
But can government in fact decide to accept no responsibility whatsoever for 
uncertain threats to physical safety? Economies of scale, globalisation, techno-
logical innovation, widespread human interference with and creeping changes 
to the system are distinctive causes of uncertainty (rmno 2004). Government 
often involves itself in taking decisions on and promoting the associated op-
portunities. In doing so, it also becomes responsible (or co-responsible) – im-
plicitly, indirectly and possibly also unconsciously – for the threats. Reliable 
government can be expected to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages. 
As German social theorist Ulrich Beck (1986; 2009) and his British contempo-
rary Anthony Giddens (1994) explained convincingly in their books about the 
risk society, parties will hold government accountable for uncertainty, regard-
less. Past experience has taught society a few things about physical safety. It 
has discovered uncertainty. Governments in the West have even been forced to 
accept a certain amount of responsibility for faulty knowledge and conflicting 
values even in wireless communication, which enjoys an exceptionally large 
measure of social support.9 To ensure that it can cope with such public pres-
sure, then, government would do well to take the initiative. 
The history of the asbestos problem has shown that government will pay a 
heavy price if damage occurs that is unforeseen, initially uncertain, but ultima-
tely undisputable. That is not to say that the asbestos scenario will repeat itself 
with every innovation, but it is unwise to assume that it will never repeat itself 
at all. It is usually very expensive for government to serve as a safety net or life 
buoy (‘last resort’). In order to allocate responsibility for uncertain damage pro-
perly (see Chapter 4), it should take uncertainty seriously and accept some or all 
of the responsibility for investigating it.10 
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3.6  organise the way uncertaint y is dealt with
 Dealing proactively with uncertainty requires an ability to let go of familiar 
frameworks. It means leaving room for testing, learning, unlearning and 
experimentation. That requires other processes and mechanisms and a 
different allocation of roles. “If government is to learn to solve new public 
problems, it must also learn to create the systems for doing so and to discard 
the structures and mechanisms grown up around old problems” (Schön 
1971: 116). The wrr’s report on the ‘learning government’ [Lerende overheid, 
2008] argues that issues that come down to faulty knowledge and conflicting 
values (referred to in that report as ‘untamed problems’) require reflection, 
investigation and dialogue with differing parties before determining who can 
or should take on which role and responsibility.
How can we organise the way we deal with uncertainty? What do we need? 
The process of searching for sound uncertainty mechanisms has only just 
begun. The Government’s strategic paper on Nuchter omgaan met risico’s 
[Dealing pragmatically with risk] (2006) proposed that ‘procedural agreements’ 
should provide the basis (Letter to House of Representatives, Pieter van Geel, 
State Secretary of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, 29 May 2006). 
For example: 
–  choosing a transparent political decision-making process;
–  when decisions are taken, specifying the responsibilities to be borne by go-
vernment, businesses and citizens;
–  to the extent possible, explicitly weighing the dangers and risks associated 
with an activity against the costs and benefits to society;
– involving citizens explicitly in policymaking at an earlier stage than in the 
past (with the extent of that involvement and the form it takes depending on 
the issue);
–  making allowance for the possibility of cumulative risk in decision-making.
In Uncertain Safety, we tried to find a basis for dealing proactively with safety 
in legal (e.g. the constitutional and statutory enshrinement of the precautionary 
principle) and institutional provisions (such as forms of public participation 
and a more active role for parliament). In this document we seek reference 
points specifically in mechanisms that involve reflection, investigation and 
dialogue (uncertainty mechanisms). What settings are conducive to reflection, 
investigation and an in-depth dialogue about uncertainty? Can uncertainty be 
taken seriously? Can we accept uncertainty while simultaneously taking steps 
to deal with it? Do uncertainty mechanisms provide a basis for allocating roles 
and responsibilities? Will they help us arrive at a balanced appraisal of opportu-
nities and threats? 
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	 Textbox	3.1	Uncertain	Safety	(wrr	2008)	
	 How can individual responsibility for safety issues be increased? What 
is the basis of government risk management and risk policy and do they 
match the risks? The policy field of physical safety faces general risk 
management problems caused by the traditional approach to risk. In this 
approach, risks are identified in terms of probability and impacts, based 
on scientific research. Once that has happened, a decision is taken as 
to whether preventive measures are necessary. If the answer is yes, the 
various responsibilities associated with organising risk reduction are 
allocated. Accordingly, the traditional approach has two distinct stages: 
risk assessment and risk management. Both stages raise questions of a 
scientific and political nature. The wrr has concluded that the traditional 
risk approach and the ways in which the responsibility for safety issues 
are allocated are insufficiently future-proof. The countless regulations that 
have emerged over time have led to administrative and financial problems, 
for government as well as the business sector. Moreover, there is often 
little prospect of achieving consistency in regulation. The domain as a 
whole is characterised by a lack of transparency. However, the Council 
also observes that a new approach to risk has evolved in policymaking 
and research that has taken shape primarily at the organisational level. 
In addition, it has become increasingly clear that risk is patently more 
complex than previously assumed. The new risk approach therefore 
concentrates not on dealing with known risks, but rather on dealing with 
uncertainties. Such uncertainties should be translated as far as possible 
into objectified risks. Because a one-to-one translation is not always 
possible, a certain level of uncertainty will persist when weighing up 
possibilities and taking decisions. The leading normative principle for the 
paradigm of the new risk approach is the precautionary principle. Within 
that paradigm, ‘precaution’ refers to the awareness that uncertainties 
need to be taken seriously and that organisations should explicitly reflect 
this attitude. Where precaution is accepted as the normative principle, 
risk assessment and management processes will be geared to the early 
detection and discussion of uncertainties; when decisions are taken, 
any remaining uncertainties will be explicitly taken into account. The 
vulnerability of people, society and the natural environment demands 
a proactive approach to uncertainties. Formulated in this way, the wrr 
argues, the precautionary principle reflects the normative basis of the new 
risk approach. 
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The distinction between faulty knowledge and conflicting values is relevant 
here. When faulty knowledge is at issue, reflection and investigation are para-
mount. There have been various attempts to take this type of uncertainty se-
riously. Examples include the Knowledge Platform on Electromagnetic Fields, 
the Nanotechnology Public Dialogue Committee, and the future National 
Prevention Platform. Such mechanisms demand forms of interaction other than 
the customary ones and require the parties involved – including the experts –  
to take on other roles than they normally do. In situations where expertise 
	 Textbox	3.2		Dutch	Knowledge	Platform	on	Electromagnetic	Fields	&	Health	
	 		 				(EMF	&	Health)
The Dutch Knowledge Platform on Electromagnetic Fields (emf & Health) 
was set up by the Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and 
the Environment (rivm), tno Netherlands Organisation for Applied 
Scientific Research, kema energy consulting, testing and certification, 
ggd Nederland municipal health organisation for preventive healthcare, 
the Radiocommunications Agency (part of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation), and the Netherlands Organisation 
for Health Research and Development (ZonMw). The Platform was esta-
blished in response to a need to cluster expertise on emf and to offer access 
to and communicate about research and knowledge “quickly, objectively 
and independently” (House of Representatives, session 2005-2006, 27 
561, no. 24, p. 4). This need is related to the lingering public concern about 
mobile communication technologies and high-voltage cables. The platform 
can be seen as a bridge between science and society because it interprets 
scientific knowledge for a broad public and addresses and answers the pu-
blic’s questions. This “public consciousness” is represented by a Feedback 
Committee, which meets one to five times a year. The committee’s mem-
bers represent various organisations that represent the specific interests of 
citizens, businesses, employers, employees and government regarding the 
health aspects of emfs. In recent years, interest groups – in particular those 
that advocate recognising emfs as a health threat – have fought to put the 
following topics on the political agenda: electro-hyper sensibility, children 
and emfs, and the transparency and integrity of science. 
Dutch National Prevention Platform
The National Prevention Platform is made up of employees, employers, 
insurers and research institutions. The Platform addresses risks that have 
not yet been identified. The National Union of Insurers (Verbond van 
Verzekeraars) also plays a role. The Platform focuses in particular on work-
related issues and creates roadmaps for further action. 
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or knowledge is disputed, experts should take on the role of what Van Dijk et 
al. (2011) refer to as ‘mapping the decision situation’: presenting the relevant 
scientific knowledge by focusing on identifying and interpreting uncertainties 
(see also Van Asselt et al. 2010). That requires experts to be open and willing to 
discuss faulty knowledge openly. 
In the case of conflicting values, experts play a much more limited role. When 
values conflict, an in-depth dialogue about normative principles is crucial. 
Reflection and investigation are also necessary, but they tend to take a back seat. 
An in-depth dialogue between different (and frequently dissimilar) parties 
should offer a basis for joint action and for the allocation of responsibility, des-
pite the normative differences. 
There are also situations in which faulty knowledge and conflicting values 
interfere. The Rathenau Institute (which informs political and public opinion 
on science and technology) and comparable organisations elsewhere have exa-
mined uncertainty questions of this kind. What can we learn from them? Who 
is in a position to head a dialogue on this topic ?
It is important to investigate the existing mechanisms systematically, and to 
also consider research and studies carried out abroad.11 What we recommend, 
then, is that we learn from existing uncertainty mechanisms, or attempts to 
create such mechanisms.12 Which factors lead to success, and which to failure? 
What are the underlying prerequisites? What can we learn about the role that 
differing parties (citizens, businesses, civil society organisations, insurers, ex-
perts, politicians, public servants) play in exploring uncertainty? 
3.7  incorporation into policy 
The question of how to deal with risks and uncertainty is certainly not new and 
has been examined many times before. Numerous policies have already been 
produced concerning physical safety and, to a greater or lesser extent, how res-
ponsibility should be allocated. The more interesting question now is how our 
five guidelines (intertwine opportunities and threats; make allowance for social 
and psychological properties of danger; utilise risk comparisons; accept uncer-
tainty and the responsibility for uncertainty; organise how uncertainty is dealt 
with) can be used in existing policy practice. In the following sections, we look 
at the National Risk Assessment, intended to support policy, and at a planned 
review of the Netherlands’ Environment and Planning Act (the Simply Better 
operation), which will take legislation and regulations governing area-specific 
risks to physical safety into account. The purpose of our exercise is to illustrate 
that existing policy practice can offer us reference points for a more general ap-
proach to potential threats. 
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3.7.1  the national risk assessment 
Since 2007, the National Risk Assessment (nra),13,14 initially the responsibility 
of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations but now falling under 
the Ministry of Security and Justice, has concentrated on risk comparison. The 
nra concerns itself with safety issues that could lead to social disruption (ca-
tastrophe potential). The nra is used to make suggestions for the role of gover-
nment and the means it should use in the interests of prevention, preparation 
and emergency assistance (referred to as ‘capacity planning’).15
Looking at opportunities
The nra is an asymmetrical representation of safety issues: it looks only at 
threats. This unilateral approach is understandable, given that the exercise is 
concerned with social disruption (catastrophe potential). But the safety is-
sues that are included in the nra also offer opportunities. The risk involved 
in processing hazardous substances is balanced by the economic interests of 
the petro-chemical industry; the uncertain health risks involved in intensive 
livestock farming are balanced by the economic interests of this sector; and the 
risk of flooding is balanced by fertile soil and the enjoyment people get from 
living along a river or lake. If we look at the opportunities (in the nra or com-
plementary documents), we immediately face another question: what share of 
the responsibility is borne by those who enjoy the benefits?
	 Textbox	3.3	National	Risk	Assessment
National Risk Assessment
In 2009, the oecd published a report on innovation in country risk 
management in which the Dutch National Risk Assessment (nra) was 
cited as a best practice, along with the British National Risk Assessment. 
According to the oecd report, the Netherlands stands out in particular 
in helping policymakers understand the potential impacts and likelihood 
of catastrophic events. Its coordinators also motivate participants by con-
tinuing to recruit new and different participants for the network (oecd, 
2009: 41).
Multidimensional risk comparison
Despite all the snags, an attempt is being made to compare a huge variety of 
different risks (with the help of various research institutes). The method makes 
allowance for the social and psychological properties of risks. Multidimensional 
risk comparison has thus been institutionalised. It is nevertheless striking how 
unknown the National Risk Assessment is in the Netherlands, even though it is 
cited as an exemplary in international circles (see textbox 3.3). The nra is po-
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tentially very useful, but could be used more widely as both an instrument and 
a process for inter-ministerial risk comparison. 
Although the nra tries to pay serious attention to the various risk properties 
and types of damage, using a single yardstick to measure aggregates of dif-
ferent threats means that the normative and political appraisal of the differing 
dimensions becomes invisible. The nra also pays virtually no attention to 
cumulative risks. It does not look explicitly at the possibility that differing risks 
could manifest themselves at the same time and trigger other incidents, thereby 
also increasing the likelihood of certain risks. The nra could make better use 
of a risk comparison process that takes differing dimensions into account. For 
example, safety issues could be clustered by various social and psychological 
properties.16 It would then be possible to consider more general starting points 
for safety policy per cluster, in keeping with the specific context.
It is naturally possible to apply another normative appraisal system that gives 
rise to a different list of political priorities. The nra acknowledges this, but 
these alternatives are too often hidden away in background documents. That is 
why political circles can treat the nra (and dismiss it) as a technocratic exercise 
instead of a tool for political appraisal. It is a missed opportunity to view speci-
fic risks within a broader context. 
Uncertainty agenda
As it now stands, the nra is a risk comparison. It treats all safety issues as suf-
ficiently known and undisputed, even if this underlying assumption is open 
to debate. That means that it does not have the scope to examine uncertainty; 
faulty knowledge and conflicting values are concealed. What is required is for 
experts to identify faulty knowledge and, where possible, conflicting values 
and not to hide them away in a ‘best guess’. How can uncertainty be articulated 
in the nra process? Should experts be encouraged to identify relevant uncer-
tainties? Or would it be possible to broaden the circle of stakeholders (see also 
Chapter 4) so that input for a process of deliberation cannot be hijacked by ex-
perts who presume to know better? 
The nra could be complemented by an Uncertainty Agenda, which would 
address a small number (for example three) uncertainty issues that invite re-
flection, investigation and dialogue. This approach would fit in with the emer-
ging practice of ministerial and inter-ministerial ‘Knowledge Agendas’. An 
Uncertainty Agenda can help foster acceptance of uncertainty and to explore 
uncertainty as it relates to physical safety. Government can take the initiative in 
this or leave it to others (see also Chapter 4). 
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The guidelines for dealing with risk and uncertainty elaborated in this chapter 
can be used to help improve and boost the nra. At the same time, this mental 
exercise shows us how the guidelines can be put into practice.
3.7.2  amending environment and planning law:  
the Simply Better  operation
Legislation governing the physical surroundings – environment and planning 
law – is important to area-specific risks and uncertainty. The existing legislation 
is highly complex. There are a total of more than sixty acts, for example the 
Spatial Planning Act, the Spatial Planning and Development Permits (General 
Provisions) Act, the Water Act, the Soil Protection Act, the Environmental 
Management Act, and so on. There are also more than a hundred general or-
ders in council and hundreds of ministerial decrees. The Rutte Government’s 
coalition agreement (2010) announced a set of proposals designed to cluster, 
streamline, modernise and cut back on the rules and regulations. This was 
also the purpose of the Simply Better operation, coordinated by the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and Environment. According to the plans (which are ambi-
tious), the operation will lead to a bill (June 2012) and then to a single law, the 
Environment and Planning Act, scheduled to be ready by the end of the current 
Government’s term in office. 
The new law proposes to put a new system into place for managing the physical 
environment. This includes physical structures (including structures for flood 
protection, traffic and transport, housing, industry and business activity) and 
for the physical environment (including water, soil and air). Simply Better thus 
also concerns legislation that applies to area-specific threats to physical safety, 
for example safety in tunnels and on the railways, the storage and processing 
of hazardous substances, and construction safety. Epidemics (including animal 
and plant diseases) and food safety are not covered, nor is any legislation per-
taining to the licensing of chemical substances, nanotechnology and genetically 
modified organisms.17 Nevertheless, it would be useful to see whether the gui-
delines we have identified for dealing with risk and uncertainty can be included 
in the Simply Better operation.
The Simply Better operation is only one step in an ambitious plan. At the time 
of writing, however, nothing more was known about the Environment and 
Planning Act than its main outlines and general contours, recently explained in 
a letter addressed to the Dutch House of Representatives (28 June 2011). That 
has made it difficult to key into this policy development, even though those 
involved have been generous with their information. At the same time, the fact 
that the operation focuses on area-specific physical safety shows that the guide-
lines for dealing with risk and uncertainty are relevant (or should be). What fol-
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lows can be regarded as a reflection on Simply Better as an ambition. As a result, 
not all of the suggestions are immediately relevant to the project as it currently 
stands; they may become more appropriate in the follow-up steps. 
Threats and the export value of physical safety
The responsibility for physical safety should also be considered within the con-
text of the Netherlands’ position in international markets and our international 
responsibility. Incidents, especially in border regions, can have an impact on 
neighbouring countries. Flooding in the Netherlands affects the reputation of 
our water management sector, which is a promising niche for the Dutch econo-
my (see the wrr report Aan het buitenland gehecht (2010). The crisis involving 
the ehec bacterium illustrates how important food safety is for our agriculture 
and horticulture sectors. These examples show that physical safety has an ex-
port value (see also Chapter 4).
The practice of ‘goldplating’, is referred to disdainfully within the context of 
the Simply Better operation. Goldplating occurs when national governments 
impose extra stringent safety requirements when transposing European direc-
tives into national law. The aim of Simply Better is to reduce ‘national goldpla-
ting’ of European directives as much as possible with a view to opportunities. 
Given that eu environmental law has been harmonised, it would certainly be 
useful to look at national environment and planning law as a single, coherent 
whole. This does, however, require us to continue asking whether there are 
enough guarantees of physical safety, even taking government’s statutory obli-
gations into account. The danger is that by focusing too single-mindedly on 
the opportunities, we will put accomplishments in the field of physical safety 
at risk and miss chances to promote the Netherlands’ international interests, as 
mentioned above. 
The Netherlands’ population density, its intense level of economic activity, 
geographical location, open society and role as an international trading nation 
may make it more vulnerable in future than some European directives assume. 
For example, the chemicals and petro-chemicals industries are very important 
to the Dutch economy, while areas in which those industries operate are in fact 
becoming much more built up (Adviesraad Gevaarlijke Stoffen 2011). That rai-
ses specific safety questions for the Netherlands. 
In short, goldplating may well be necessary if the aim is to ensure physical 
safety. What worries about physical safety were behind the legislation and 
rules produced back then, and are those worries still relevant? Has the danger 
increased or decreased over time? In what way does the Netherlands seem most 
vulnerable, either now or in the future, and is the ‘goldplating’ of European le-
gislation desirable? Conversely, which laws and rules have become superfluous 
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because physical safety is already being safeguarded or more effectively safe-
guarded in some other way? Asking these questions shows clearly what specific 
national regulations should be added on top of European legislation with a view 
to the threats.
	 Textbox	3.4	Löfstedt	Review
The foregoing questions were inspired by the uk’s Löfstedt Review (named 
after its president, risk sociologist Ragnar Löfstedt of King’s College, 
London) (dwp, 2011a). The final report was published in November 2011. 
Its goal was “[to] consider the opportunities for reducing the burden of 
health and safety legislation on uk businesses whilst maintaining the pro-
gress made in improving health and safety outcomes” (dwp 2011b: 2). The 
Review considers a substantial database of regulations, many of which can 
be considered to be in the area of safety. The Löfstedt Review was indepen-
dent, but it had an advisory board made up of the representatives of various 
political parties, employers and employees. The process of gathering in-
formation on the effectiveness of regulation was participative: interested 
parties were invited to join via a website and other media. The conclusions 
of the Löfstedt Review were as follows:
1. The general sweep of requirements set out in health and safety regula-
tion are broadly fit for purpose but there are a few that offer little benefit to 
health and safety and which the Government should remove, revise or cla-
rify, in particular the duties for self-employed people whose work activities 
pose no potential risk of harm to others.
2. The much bigger problem is that regulatory requirements are misunder-
stood and applied inappropriately. The recommended changes seek to ad-
dress where this arises by:
a.  streamlining the body of regulation through consolidation;
b. re-directing enforcement activity towards businesses where there is the 
greatest risk of injury or ill health;
c. re-balancing the civil justice system by clarifying the status of pre-action 
protocols and reviewing strict liability provisions. 
3. This will help to ensure that all key elements of the regulatory and legal 
system are better targeted towards risk and support the proper management 
of health and safety instead of a focus on trying to cover every possible risk 
and accumulating paperwork.
The Löfstedt Review provides the following key recommendations:
– Exempt from health and safety law those self-employed whose work 
activities pose no potential risk of harm to others.
– Have the Health and Safety Executive (hse) review all its ACoPs. The 
initial phase of the review should be completed by June 2012 so busines-
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ses have certainty about what is planned and when changes can be antici-
pated.
– Have hse undertake a programme of sector-specific consolidations to be 
completed by April 2015.
– Change legislation to give hse the authority to direct all local authority 
health and safety inspection and enforcement activity, in order to ensure 
that it is consistent and targeted towards the most risky workplaces.
– Clarify and restate the original intention of the pre-action protocol 
standard disclosure list and review regulatory provisions that impose 
strict liability by June 2013 and either qualify them as ‘reasonably practi-
cable’ where strict liability is not absolutely necessary or amend them to 
prevent civil liability from attaching to a breach of those provisions.
It is also important when simplifying the rules to ask whether, and if so how, 
improvements can be made in safety, for example by enforcing the rules more 
strictly (see also Chapters 2 and 4) or allocating the responsibility for physical 
safety more effectively (see also Chapter 4). 
Dealing with uncertainty
The Environment and Planning Act will seek to strike a balance between highly 
detailed rules (target or means requirements) and a more general form of re-
gulation, for example, duties of care and open standards.18 Use of these latter 
results from the wish to reduce the number of rules and the administrative 
burden and give those charged with execution greater freedom. The distinction 
between risks and uncertainty seems to be relevant in the quest for a balance. 
If the threats to physical safety are sufficiently known and undisputed, and the 
most effective risk management methods are clear, then it is possible to impose 
specific requirements. Indeed, smes often prefer detailed rules so that business 
owners know precisely where they stand.19 We would like to emphasise that 
risk regulation can also be a form of knowledge transfer to businesses. Ideally, 
rules embody ‘a consolidated body of experience’, relieving business owners of 
the work of investing individually in the necessary knowledge.20 Risk legisla-
tion should therefore not be regarded only as an administrative burden, because 
it can also lighten the load for businesses. 
In the case of risk, a duty of care can serve as an additional safety net beneath 
specific legislation and regulations. In the case of uncertainty, however, a duty 
of care is the starting point. Uncertainty involves a fundamental basis of doubt 
regarding the need for policy, the reference points for that policy, and the policy 
framework (see Chapter 1). Faulty knowledge and conflicting values prevent de-
tailed rules from being drawn up. Uncertainty therefore requires other forms of 
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regulation and supervision.21 A duty of care that is grounded in the law may of-
fer a statutory method of obligating businesses to take responsibility for uncer-
tainty. Business owners enjoy the benefits of the opportunities and often have 
(or could have) the most accurate view of the threats. That means reversing the 
burden of proof: businesses must demonstrate that they are acting responsi-
bly, while government is no longer obliged to demonstrate a threat to physical 
safety. In other words, a duty of care does not necessarily lighten the load. It is 
an important starting point for considering and allocating the responsibility for 
uncertainty and placing it squarely with the relevant parties. 
Continuous investigatory duty
Our reflections concerning uncertainty and risk are also relevant when consi-
dering how to cut back on investigatory duties. The planned Environment and 
Planning Act focuses on simplifying such duties and the associated burdens. 
Scientific knowledge makes it possible to estimate the impacts of risks in ad-
vance to a fair degree of accuracy. In the case of known risks, the emphasis can 
then shift to risk management (what do businesses do to prevent incidents, 
limit damage and manage risks?), rather than the investigation of impacts. The 
Minister of Infrastructure and Environment, Melanie Schultz van Haegen, 
wants less investigation in advance and more opportunity to introduce additio-
nal measures retroactively:22
“It is often impossible to exclude uncertainty about the impacts of something. 
Uncertainty can be made acceptable if it is reasonably shown in advance that ap-
propriate measures can be introduced retroactively in order to satisfy particular 
standards or meet previously agreed targets. That means conducting fewer in-
vestigations in advance and offering more opportunity to introduce additional 
measures retroactively. It also means being more willing to accept that uncertainty 
about impacts cannot be excluded.”23
We support the Minister in acknowledging uncertainty, but we also believe that 
taking uncertainty seriously requires investigation, reflection and dialogue, 
not only before but also after a permit is issued. We agree that the investigatory 
duty should not come to be regarded as an impossible demand to provide cer-
tainty about uncertain dangers. It would be counterproductive to base that duty 
on the illusion that all uncertainties can be eliminated before a decision is taken. 
The investigatory duty should focus instead on identifying faulty knowledge: 
what threats may be at issue and should be allowed for in the process of political 
appraisal? The purpose of an investigation would then be to arrive at an increa-
singly accurate understanding of the uncertain threats to physical safety, so that 
1) the political appraisal process can allow for both the opportunities and threats 
in equal measure; and 2) the responsibility for the threats can be properly or-
ganised and allocated. The focus of investigatory duty should therefore be to 
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explore uncertainty. It would then cease to be a one-off, all-inclusive obligation 
tied to decision-making and the granting of permits, but instead become a con-
tinuous task for risk-bearing parties. Businesses would therefore have the duty 
to inform government (and society in a wider sense) of the most recent insights 
into potential dangers. Based on that information, politicians then have the 
option of reappraising the situation. 
The foregoing requires that government should learn to accept uncertainty and 
have the courage to categorise dangers as uncertainties. It also requires businesses 
to accept uncertainty. There is a real danger that an intolerance for uncertainty will 
inform the way parties interpret the continuous investigatory duty (“hear no evil, 
see no evil”) (Van Asselt and Vos 2008),24 but that is contrary to what we mean by 
proactiveness. What we mean is that government must consider how to organise 
the continuous investigatory duty for businesses such that they deal with uncer-
tainty in a socially responsible manner. In her comparative study25 of environ-
mental administrative law, which focuses on the enforcement of environmental 
responsibilities, Nilsson (2011) concludes that the Swedish environmental code 
(Miljöbalken)26 is exemplary. In Sweden, risk-bearing parties have a continuous 
investigatory duty and must demonstrate that they comply with that duty. The 
burden of proof thus lies with them. Nilsson studied how the obligations associ-
ated with uncertainty are enforced in the differing national systems. She conclu-
des that even if the burden of proof lies largely with the risk-bearing parties, it is 
important for government – basing itself on independent scientific research, for 
example27 – to identify potential dangers as well so that it can order businesses to 
investigate them. She also proposes undertaking a more communicative, step-by-
step approach in which risk-bearing parties are first asked to provide basic infor-
mation and only ordered to supply additional information if the basic data points 
towards a potential danger. In addition, if there is growing evidence of threats, 
Nilsson suggests that the risk-bearing parties should be asked which measures 
they would themselves wish to take or see implemented on a sector-wide basis. 
3.8  conclusion
Is it possible to develop an overall policy focusing on potential threats to physi-
cal safety? Can that policy provide reference points for reassessing the respon-
sibilities for physical safety? By interpreting the questions put to the wrr in 
this manner, we have arrived at five guidelines: 1) intertwine opportunities and 
threats; 2) make allowance for the social and psychological properties of danger; 
3) utilise risk comparisons; 4) accept uncertainty; 5) organise how uncertainty 
is dealt with. As we wish to stress that the real challenge is to apply these gui-
delines in actual policymaking, we have attempted to find reference points in 
the National Risk Assessment and the amended Environment and Planning Act 
(via the Simply Better operation). 
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We wish to emphasise, however, that damage arrangements also play a me-
aningful role in matters of risk and uncertainty. It goes without saying that their 
purpose is to cover the losses that have been suffered, but they also offer posi-
tive or negative incentives for preventing incidents, limiting damage, managing 
risk and reducing uncertainty. Risk and uncertainty involve weighing up the 
opportunities and threats, including the associated uncertainties. Damage ar-
rangements can help the various parties – and the risk-bearing parties in parti-
cular – weigh up the two sides. That is the topic of the following chapter. 
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notes
1  Early statistical research showed that industrial accidents could not be blamed on 
individual workers because they were ‘systemic’ in nature. As a result, the Dutch In-
dustrial Accident Act [Ongevallenwet] of 1901 made employers responsible by law for 
worker safety.
2  As indicated, this is a gradual distinction (see Chapter 1, fig. 1.1): at a certain point, 
faulty knowledge and/or conflicting values become too serious, making it impossible 
to calculate risk meaningfully as a function of probability and impact. 
3  When we use the term ‘risk-based approach’ in this text, we actually mean thinking 
about danger in terms of risk. Legal specialists also use the term to refer to a particular 
type of action, i.e. intervening in suspect situations and groups in advance, where the 
yardstick is not culpability under criminal law but the risk profile (Van Swaaningen 
2001; Niemeijer and Van Wijck 2007).
4  The report that the wrr is preparing on ‘confidence in the citizen’ looks in detail at 
how citizens are equipped.
5  This was already emphasised in Nuchter omgaan met risico’s [Dealing pragmatically 
with risk] (Ministerie van vrom 2004). 
6  Every attempt to express risk in numerical terms involves making normative choices 
(wrr 1994; rivm 2003; wrr 2008; Gezondheidsraad 2008). The way that we dis-
cuss risks and ‘establish’ them inevitably reveals the different conceptual frameworks.
7  See avv/riza (2004), as commissioned by the then Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management. The former Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
Environment also conducted a similar internal risk comparison for a number of years. 
8  For example, Helsloot et al. (2010, 2011) believe that we must move away from “what 
we might suspect” and concentrate instead on what can be predicted “with some 
measure of likelihood”. In their view, uncertainty should not be allowed for in policy-
making. 
9  For example by installing the Knowledge Platform for Electromagnetic Fields and by 
financing a research programme on Electromagnetic Fields and Health (undertaken by 
ZonMw Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development and involv-
ing a budget of eur 16.6 million between 2005 and 2017). For government responses 
in other countries, see: Burgess (2004); Drake (2006); Soneryd (2007) and Stilgoe 
(2007).
10  The term precaution is used in the reports Uncertain Safety (wrr) and Prudent Pre-
caution (National Health Council of the Netherlands): “the vulnerability of people, 
society and the natural environment requires that we deal proactively with uncer-
tainty” (wrr 2008: 18). These two reports make the specific point that precaution 
is not synonymous with radical prevention. Now, three years after their publication, 
we must conclude – based on the Government’s response, the many discussions, 
and trends in policy practice since then – that the attempt made to redefine precau-
tion has not been successful so far. There is a lingering association between the term 
‘precaution’ and radical prevention. At the same time, the precautionary principle 
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has become common practice in environmental policy, is enshrined in the European 
Union’s Maastricht Treaty, has gained a place in international statutory frameworks 
and conventions, and has made its way into case law at national and European level. It 
is also invoked by citizens and civil society organisations. Precaution is therefore here 
to stay. Parties that undertake activities in which uncertainty about opportunities and 
threats plays a role will face calls for precaution or will be confronted later with their 
responsibility to take precautions. That is precisely why it is important to emphasise 
that precaution is not radical prevention, but should involve proactively dealing with 
uncertainties and considering measures to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience. 
It is precisely those who oppose the idea of radical prevention that should support 
such a reinterpretation, given the degree to which the term has become entrenched in 
society and the legal context. But in order to sidestep what is an already polarised dis-
cussion of the precautionary principle, we have decided to avoid the term precaution 
in this document.
11  See for example Weick and Sutcliffe (2007); Forester (2009) and Heazle (2010).
12  There is a similar recommendation in the Royal Academy’s research agenda (2011), 
which calls for “institutional designs and leadership practices” within the context of 
vulnerability and resilience.
13  The nra is ‘only’ part of the National Safety and Security Strategy. In our exercise, 
we regard this risk comparison instrument as a separate activity and inter-ministerial 
process for discussing risk. 
14  The risk assessment is not limited to risks in the domain of physical safety but con-
cerns all such risks in the widest sense of the word (including security risks involving 
malicious intent). 
15  For a detailed description of the method, see the document Werken met scenario’s, risi-
cobeoordeling en capaciteiten in de Strategie Nationale Veiligheid (October 2009).
16  These are now clustered in terms of impact probability.
17  How that is to be dealt with in the Environmental Management Act and related legis-
lation and regulations is still open to debate. 
18  In actual practice, it appears (according to initial observations within the context of the 
wrr’s Toezicht – i.e. Supervision – project) that regulators are still attempting to in-
terpret open standards by producing policy rules, guidelines and so on. The situation 
is tricky even in the legal domain. Similar comments have been made regarding du-
ties of care. Nevertheless, we believe that we must look beyond the practical and legal 
objections if we are to make any progress on allocating the responsibility for investi-
gating uncertainty. 
19  The danger is that a checklist culture will begin to dominate (“we’ve satisfied all of the 
government’s requirements”) (Adviesraad Gevaarlijke Stoffen 2011). This is a relevant 
point of discussion internationally too. 
20  See Degas (2010).
21  The wrr is currently studying the system of supervision and will publish a separate 
report on this topic at the end of this year. 
22  The questions that then arise are whether this is ultimately cheaper and who is to 
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bear the cost. The danger of this approach is that what are in fact illegal activities will 
be tolerated or legalised after the fact. It may be advisable from a strategic viewpoint 
to differentiate between businesses that demonstrate an intrinsic motivation to take 
responsibility for physical safety and businesses that do not (see also Chapter 4). 
23  Letter from the Minister of Infrastructure and Environment to the House of Repre-
sentatives, 28 June 2011: 9.
24  One example is the situation that arose concerning the underground storage of carbon 
dioxide. Government (cato) set up a major programme to study this. Trade and 
industry quickly became active participants. The unanimous opinion was that under-
ground storage of carbon dioxide in residential areas could not pose any major threats 
to physical safety. 
25  Sweden, the United Kingdom (England and Wales) and the Netherlands. 
26  It is interesting to report within the context of Simply Better that this environmental 
code also aimed to achieve closer coordination between legislation and regulations and 
to simplify the permit procedures (Nilsson 2011: 315).
27  See wrr (2008) for a more detailed discussion of the importance of independent 
scientific research within the domain of physical safety. 
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4  damage arrangements:  
a different perspective
4.1  damage as the focal point
The debate concerning responsibility for physical safety has wrongly neglected 
the topic of damage arrangements.1 After all, the burden associated with threats 
must be borne by someone. Arguing from the perspective of damage clarifies 
matters, because damage is something tangible. It also adds a sense of urgency. 
Who is going to help foot the bill for safety and for any damage that occurs? 
What can we expect potential sources of damage to do and to contribute? What 
role can potential victims play? To what extent are citizens and businesses res-
ponsible in a private capacity, and where does government’s collective respon-
sibility begin? Which other parties – for example insurers and lenders – might 
play a role? 
Government’s risk-regulation reflex – in the form of incident-driven legislation 
and regulations – is generating considerable attention. There is less concern for 
the financial role that government plays, is assigned or has taken upon itself 
when settling damage claims, although it does put explicit pressure on public 
finances. How we deal with damage is a focal point for questions related to res-
ponsibility: it is where issues of risk management and uncertainty can be linked 
to the urgent questions that arise in connection with incidents and damage. We 
believe that looking systematically at how we deal with damage will help us 
find reference points for reallocating responsibility in a way that will improve 
safety and may therefore trim the role of government, in any event financially.2 
Damage arrangements should serve two purposes: 1) they should cover the 
loss that has been suffered and 2) offer incentives to prevent incidents, limit 
damage, manage risks and deal proactively with uncertainty. The allocation of 
responsibilities will be balanced if 1) all the relevant parties are encouraged to 
prevent damage as much as possible, or at least to limit it, and 2) if the necessary 
financial resources are available to expedite damage control and management. 
4.2  current practices
The Netherlands has had its share of crises and disasters.3 Examples in the do-
main of physical safety include the Bijlmer Aviation Disaster (1992), flooding 
in Limburg (1993, 1995), the Bovenkarspel Legionellosis outbreak (1999), the 
Enschede Fireworks Disaster (2000), the Volendam New Year’s Eve Fire (2001), 
the Moerdijk Chemicals Fire (2011), and the food safety issues arising from 
EHEC contamination (2011). Damage suffered collectively by groups of citi-
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zens, businesses and institutions is referred to as ‘mass damage’. In addition to 
damage suffered in the private sector, it is also possible for damage to occur in 
the public domain, for example affecting the environment (soil, water and air 
pollution, loss of flora, fauna, ecosystems, landscapes or biodiversity), objects 
of cultural heritage, and infrastructure, public areas and public buildings. One 
of the concerns expressed by the Minister (the second question, see Chapter 1) 
is that the responsibility for compensating (financially) violations of physical 
safety appears to be laid automatically and unilaterally at the feet of govern-
ment. We will therefore begin by considering the role that government plays in 
today’s damage settlement practices.
	 Textbox	4.1	European	perspective	
 
“In general there seem to be three different types of reactions chosen by 
European legislators as far as the financial compensation after catastrophes 
is concerned: a first possibility is that (in addition to liability law and social 
security which exists as basic structure in every European legal system) 
no specific regulatory measures have been taken. In those cases govern-
ments may provide additional compensation for victims in some cases on 
an ad hoc basis. That seems to be the case in e.g. Germany and Sweden. A 
second possibility is that a first party insurance solution is chosen. In this 
respect we do not refer to voluntary first party insurances that victims can 
of course take in all countries where these are available on the insurance 
market, but to regulatory interventions as a result of which coverage is 
mandatorily extended to include natural disasters. That is e.g. the case in 
France, will be the case in Belgium as a result of a legislative intervention 
and is discussed in both Germany and Italy. The third approach would be 
to have an outright compensation fund for victims of disasters that can 
provide for some amounts, although usually not full compensation (such as 
under tort law). Such a disaster fund exists inter alia in Belgium as a result 
of the Disaster Act 1976.”
Nonmandatory compensation
Government plays a role in cases of mass damage in the domain of physical 
safety because it contributes voluntarily to the financial settlement of damage 
claims (Ammerlaan 2009; Bruggeman 2010). Following Den Ouden and 
Tjepkema (2006), we refer to this as nonmandatory compensation:4 govern-
ment chooses to spend public funds to help compensate victims for their losses. 
Its choice is motivated by political notions concerning the role of government, 
solidarity, ethics and decency, or by more politically strategic considerations 
(i.e. winning votes). 
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In the late 1990s, the Dutch authorities came up with a fundamental, statutory ‘solution’ 
to mass damage arising from natural disasters:5 the Damage Compensation (Disasters 
and Serious Accidents) Act (wts 1998),6,7 a scheme that is paid for entirely from the 
public purse. Another fundamental scheme was set up to deal with outbreaks of animal 
diseases: livestock owners receive compensation for the mandatory slaughter of their 
animals from the Animal Health Fund (dgf), which is based on the Animal Health and 
Welfare Act (gwwd). The fund draws on public and private sources: half is paid by the 
sector (i.e. by the industry boards), and the other half by government (primarily from 
European funds). The dgf paid out 3 billion guilders after an outbreak of swine fever in 
1997, eur 260 million during the bird flu epidemic in 2003, and eur 44 million during 
the Q fever crisis between 2007 and 2010. 
An ad hoc policy has predominated in other instances of mass damage (see Table 4.1). 
For example, the authorities created ad hoc arrangements for nonmandatory compensa-
tion after the Bijlmer Aviation Disaster (1992), the Bovenkarspel Legionellosis outbreak 
(1999), the Enschede Fireworks Disaster (2000), and the Volendam New Year’s Eve 
Fire (2001). The bird flu epidemic in 2003 led the then Minister of Agriculture, Nature 
Management and Environment to set up a second financial scheme in addition to the 
fundamental dgf in order to compensate businesses subject to transport restrictions 
in quarantined areas. This scheme covered losses that are not compensated under the 
gwwd, i.e. losses incurred due to measures taken to combat an infectious animal disease 
(Den Ouden and Tjepkema 2006). It is clear, then, that government makes ad hoc arran-
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farmers compensated by 
State Secretary Henk Bleker
The ad hoc, nonmandatory compensation schemes differ considerably in terms 
of the type of loss or damage covered (personal injury or property damage, 
compensation for costs incurred), the size of the payment, the parties eligible 
for compensation (individuals, businesses or authorities) and the method of 
financing.8 The funds set up for victims of the Enschede Fireworks Disaster 
(2000) and the Volendam New Year’s Eve Fire (2001) involved charitable dona-
tions. In the case of the swine fever, bird flu and Q fever epidemics, no one was 
directly responsible for the damage, but the relevant sector did suffer serious 
financial consequences. The compensation paid to farmers after the Moerdijk 
Chemicals Fire (2011) was similarly politically motivated. The nonmandatory 
compensation paid to victims after the Bovenkarspel Legionellosis outbreak 
(1999), the Bijlmer Aviation Disaster (1992) and the Schiphol Fire (2005) can be 
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described as a frugal expression of sympathy in the form of a one-off payment 
for immaterial damage. The schemes set up for the victims of the Enschede 
Fireworks Disaster and the Volendam New Year’s Eve Fire were much more 
generous. They encompassed a supplementary social insurance benefit (for 
personal injury) (ctrc 2004 and Ammerlaan 2009) and, in the case of the fire-
works disaster, compensation for property damage (Van der Helm 2003). The 
nonmandatory compensation paid out by the national government to local aut-
horities after the Moerdijk Chemicals Fire (2011)9 was based on the intergovern-
mental rationale that local government should not be saddled with the costs.10 
There is a persistent misconception that government pays out nonmandatory 
compensation only in cases of mass damage. In fact, victims of premeditated 
crimes of violence also receive compensation from a special government fund 
(Groenhuijsen 2001). A special compensation scheme was also set up in 2000 
for mesothelioma patients who had contracted the disease due to occupational 
exposure to asbestos.11 The scheme pays workers with an irrecoverable claim a 
lump-sum benefit (Peeters 2007). It is therefore conceivable that government 
will eventually play an even larger role in the domain of physical safety by 
providing nonmandatory compensation for forms of uncompensated damage 
other than mass damage, for example because individual victims or civil society 
organisations unite to exert political pressure.12 
Government thus has a choice in cases of nonmandatory compensation. It is 
not under a statutory obligation to compensate the injured parties. It is also 
free to decide whether it will create claims and, if so, how far it is prepared to 
go, within the limits set by general principles of good governance. This makes 
it possible for government to set financial ceilings (per scheme or claimant), to 
limit the group of potential claimants, to establish criteria related to the clai-
mants’ financial means, and to impose additional requirements and obligations 
(Den Ouden and Tjepkema 2006). 
Government liability
Government can also be held liable for deficient supervision or enforcement, 
for errors in granting permits, and for faulty maintenance leading to violations 
of physical safety or additional damage. It is then subject to a statutory obliga-
tion to pay damages. If the courts find that government should be held liable, 
then the case involves a lawful or unlawful act on the part of government under 
administrative law, or an unlawful act under civil liability law. Victims of the 
Bovenkarspel Legionellosis outbreak (1999), the Enschede Fireworks Disaster 
(2000) and the Schiphol Fire (2005) made unsuccessful attempts to hold gover-
nment liable in civil proceedings (Barkhuysen and Van Emmerik 2003, 2004; 
Van Maanen 2007). The Dutch courts seem reluctant to accept government 
liability under civil law for violations of physical safety.13 This means that go-
physical safety56
vernment enjoys considerable immunity (Van Ravels 2006). That immunity is 
not unrestricted, of course, nor should it be: in a constitutional system, it must 
be possible to hold government accountable for its failings. 
Public damage
In addition, government foots the bill for public damage (i.e. damage in the 
public domain). It can attempt to recover the cost from the party that caused 
the damage, if such a party can be designated (which is not possible when the 
causes are primarily natural ones), but if that proves impossible, then the cost is 
covered from the public purse. 
In short, when damage arises in the domain of physical safety, government 
tends to step in if damage in the public domain cannot be recovered and it 
provides nonmandatory compensation for damage in the private domain. In 
addition, the social insurance system (including the Sickness Benefits Act, 
the Disability Benefits Act, the National Assistance Act, the Unemployment 
Benefits Act, and the Surviving Dependants Act) can also be classified as dama-
ge arrangements, because those who have suffered illness, occupational disabi-
lity and loss of income due to violations of physical safety can fall back on such 
schemes.14 Government also often makes ad hoc arrangements to compensate 
those who have fallen victim to uncompensated mass damage through no fault 
of their own (nonmandatory compensation). We must emphasise, once again, 
that government is not required to do so, but that a refusal does not solve the 
problem of uncompensated damage. That is why we will consider the reasons 
for uncompensated damage. Our examination of this question will bring par-
ties to light that could or should play a role in damage arrangements. 
4.3  reasons for uncompensated damage
Uncompensated damage is a many-headed monster. There are various reasons 
why damage may be uncompensated in current practice. It may be that the 
damage cannot be ascribed to a particular source, or that the threat to physical 
safety was uninsurable or uninsured. The damage may also be irrecoverable, 
even if a source has been established. The victims’ inability to bear or recover all 
or part of an uncompensated loss results in a political problem. Damage is also 
uncompensated if government is unable to recover a loss from the source of 
public damage. All these reasons imply that there is a range of political and ad-
ministrative challenges involved and many different reference points for reas-
sessing the allocation of responsibility. We must therefore look more closely at 
the various reasons for uncompensated damage. 
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Attribution problem
Many threats to and violations of physical safety centre on the question of who 
or what is responsible for the damage (attribution of damage or suffering, for 
example a chronic illness, a loss of biodiversity, a decline in wellbeing or the 
loss of an object of cultural heritage). The problem of attribution often means 
that damage is irrecoverable and, possibly, uninsured or uninsurable. Mourik 
(2004) provides an example in which the damage (dead livestock) could not be 
attributed to polluted water even though the contamination had been demon-
strated beyond a doubt. None of the parties involved would admit responsibi-
lity for the situation. The livestock remained sick (or continued to get sick), the 
water was still polluted, and several of the farmers involved went bankrupt. 
This example illustrates how the attribution problem can serve as a negative 
incentive for avoiding damage and risk management. 
Irrecoverable damage: getting blood from a stone
Dutch tort law sets strict eligibility requirements for compensation (Tzankova 
2007). Even if victims have cleared the hurdle of tort law, the damage is often ir-
recoverable owing to limited coverage under the responsible party’s liability insu-
rance policy and that party’s limited ability to pay (Table 4.2). Victims – including 
government – have little or no recourse to the party that caused the damage. Small 
and medium-sized companies often have liability insurance that covers approxima-
Table	4.2	 Examples	of	damage	arrangements	or	lack	of	such	arrangements	in	violations	of	
physical	safety	(for	the	specific	damage/loss,	see	Table	4.1)
inci den t i nsurance coverage and solvenc y
Bijlmer Aviation Disaster 
(1992)
Boeing and El Al were sufficiently insured and solvent. Victims 
in the “zone of danger” received full compensation from El Al 




Exhibitor 1: eur 453,780 and Exhibitor 2: EUR 1.13 million; loss 
irrecoverable from parties responsible
Enschede Fireworks 
Disaster (2000)
SE Fireworks: eur 1.13 million; loss irrecoverable from party/
parties responsible
Volendam New Year’s Eve 
Fire (2001)
Pub owner’s own assets: several millions of guilders; insurance 
coverage: eur 1.13 million; loss partly irrecoverable from party 
responsible
Moerdijk Chemicals Fire 
(2011)
According to the media, the insurance fell far short of covering 
the damage and the insurer has so far refused to pay. Chemie-
Pack has since gone into liquidation, but has been relaunched 
under a new name and new management. Loss is irrecoverable 
from the party responsible
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tely eur 1 to 2.5 million in the event of damage arising from liability.15 Experience 
shows that this is never enough in cases of mass damage and/or serous public da-
mage. Nor can consolation be found in the company’s equity. What makes such ca-
ses additionally complex is that insurers are not obliged to compensate for damage 
in cases of an act or omission that is purposeful, knowing and reckless (opzettelijk), 
regardless of the amount of coverage. The party that has caused the damage can be 
sentenced via the criminal courts and liability can be established under criminal 
law, but whether the victims will be able to recover their losses depends entirely on 
that party’s business and private assets. On top of everything else, victims will be 
making only one of many competing claims if a business that has caused damage 
goes into liquidation. 
The problem of irrecoverable damage played a role in the Enschede Fireworks 
Disaster (SE Fireworks), the Bovenkarspel Legionellosis outbreak (exhibi-
tors), the Volendam New Year’s Eve Fire (the pub owner), and the Moerdijk 
Chemicals Fire (Chemie-Pack). Wringing financial compensation from the 
relevant businesses was like getting blood from a stone (Table 4.2). The contrast 
with the Bijlmer Aviation Disaster could not be greater: El Al and Boeing orga-
nised satisfactory damage arrangements. The aviation sector is often mentioned 
and praised as admirable. It combines exemplary damage arrangements with 
a culture of safety in which the core business is to prevent incidents, avoid or 
limit damage, manage risks and deal with uncertainty. This example suggests a 
practical correlation between the two aims of damage arrangements: covering 
damage and preventing it. 
Given the problem of recoverability, we may certainly expect risk-bearing 
businesses to take steps to limit damage, manage risk and deal proactively with 
uncertainty (see also 4.4.1). Once an incident has occurred, victims and govern-
ment have often been turned away empty-handed. 
Insurable/uninsurable
Damage may also be uncompensated because it is uninsurable: there is no insu-
rance package available to cover the specific risk, or the premiums are considered 
out of proportion to the cover (and as a result, no one takes out policies and the 
insurance company discontinues the package). This plays a role in natural disas-
ters, environmental damage, mass damage and new and hence uncertain risks. 
The problem of insurability becomes urgent if the victims are unable to bear 
most or all of the loss, if the damage is irrecoverable (even if there is a responsi-
ble party), and if government is unwilling to pay nonmandatory compensation 
or does not have or wish to use resources to compensate public damage. The 
question is therefore: can the potential sources of damage (by means of third 
party coverage16) and potential victims (by means of first party coverage17) in fact 
insure themselves adequately against risks in the realm of physical safety?
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The rationale behind the Damage Compensation (Disasters and Serious 
Accidents) Act (wts) lay precisely in such problems of insurability. Since the 
devastating floods that struck the Netherlands in 1953, Dutch insurers have 
insisted that the risk of flooding is uninsurable (Faure and Hartlief 2002).18 
Insurability or uninsurability is therefore not a law of nature; it is the result of 
negotiation. Increasing the scope of insurability usually requires insurers, rein-
surers and government19 to join forces20 and citizens and businesses to be pre-
pared to insure themselves or to show solidarity in that regard. There have been 
various attempts to make flood risk insurable, but these cases illustrate how 
difficult it is to clear all the various hurdles. They also demonstrate that there is 
scope for innovation in the world of insurance, however. Indeed, some progress 
has been made: certain risks related to water damage can now be insured. Flood 
damage caused by rainwater is covered by brick and mortar insurance, and har-
vests can also be insured against water damage.
According to Faure and Hartlief (2002; 2006a; 2006b), progress in extending 
the scope of insurability has ground to a halt because the private insurance mar-
ket has been unable to find solutions to such problems as cumulative damage, 
faulty data and the phenomenon that only high-risk individuals and businesses 
take out insurance (adverse selection).21 In their view, insurers should be encou-
raged to solve these problems and not conclude too quickly that certain threats 
to physical safety are uninsurable, with the responsibility for damage automati-
cally being shifted to government. But the question is whether government has 
itself failed to take advantage of opportunities to make risks, for example flood 
risk, insurable, and whether it might still be able to do so. 
It is often assumed pre-emptively that uncertainty is uninsurable and that 
insurers cannot play a meaningful role in damage arrangements. The thinking 
is that it is impossible for insurers to calculate a suitable premium if the risk is 
insufficiently known. And yet, there are certain potential violations of physical 
safety that can be described as highly uncertain but to which insurance makes 
a decided contribution to the relevant damage arrangements. One is in the field 
of nuclear energy, where a stratified system has been created:22 nuclear power 
plants are obligated to take out liability insurance coverage for EUR 340 million 
(after the Nuclear Accidents Liability Act (wako) enters into force, that sum 
will increase to eur 700 million).23 Several insurers participate in a Dutch ato-
mic energy insurance pool set up for this purpose, with most of the risk being 
reinsured with foreign atomic energy insurance pools. If the amount paid out 
is insufficient, part of the loss will be borne by the countries that have signed 
the Brussels Convention. Nuclear accident compensation and liability is regu-
lated under the oecd’s 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field 
of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention), and the iaea’s 1963 Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna Convention). Insurance or financial secu-
physical safety60
rity is mandatory, yet there are limits on the amount, duration and types of da-
mage, and strict and channelled liability for the plant operator. The Dutch State 
also has a eur 14 billion guarantee obligation (under the Ministry of Finance’s 
budget), i.e. more than eur 2 billion per plant covered under the wako (eur 
3.2 billion after the Act is amended). The State is required to provide the gua-
rantee.24 The Dutch government thus acts as a reinsurer in this case (see also 
Bruggeman 2010). This example shows that setting a ceiling on liability can 
help create a market for insurance and help market parties discipline one ano-
ther when it comes to avoiding incidents, preventing damage, managing risks 
and exploring uncertainty. 
Another example comes from the domain of security and concerns the way in 
which insurers deal with the uncertainty of terrorism. After 9/11, insurers – 
feeling pressure from reinsurers25 – removed damage or loss arising from acts 
of terrorism from all their policies. However, in 2003 a dedicated reinsurance 
company for terrorism cover, the nht, was set up in the Netherlands to which 
insurers make proportional contributions, with government as a ‘last resort’ for 
catastrophic damage.26 If a terrorist act leads to mass damage, in other words, 
the damage arrangements will be made through the insurance sector. 
It is clear that innovative damage mechanisms are feasible for uncertainty 
as well, and that insurers or the insurance industry may have a part to play. 
Introducing such mechanisms will, however, require fundamental political 
choices. One such decision could be to focus on first party insurance for envi-
ronment risks. That would mean that potential victims would take out insu-
rance against damage (or would be obliged to do so), even though they carry 
none of the blame for the threats.27 Such a system is contrary to our modern 
sense of fair play, but in certain circumstances it would make it possible to pro-
vide coverage for (uncertain) damage. 
Uninsured damage as a political issue 
Alongside uninsurable damage, some incidents may lead to uninsured loss 
that is beyond the victims’ ability to bear. It is unreasonable to expect potential 
victims – individuals and businesses – to make extensive insurance coverage for 
environment risk a priority in their cost-benefit analysis. Basically, then, insu-
rable damage is not always insured or adequately insured. In addition, it is only 
when the damage becomes visible that the actual degree of coverage is clear. 
Only then do individuals and businesses that once considered themselves well 
insured find they are facing uninsured damage after all. Cover is seldom unlimi-
ted; the claims paid out tend to be standardised amounts. But an insured party 
may only discover that after the damage is done. 
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Many of the victims of the Enschede Fireworks Disaster, which devastated a 
low-income neighbourhood, were underinsured or uninsured (Ammerlaan 
2009); the same was true of the Bijlmer Aviation Disaster, in part because many 
of the victims were illegal aliens. When individuals or businesses suffer unin-
sured damage through no fault of their own, the incident very quickly becomes 
a government matter, especially if the victims are unable to bear most or all of 
the loss. If the loss is irrecoverable, for example because the party causing the 
damage was underinsured, it would be cruel to ignore the uninsured or under-
insured victims, who in many cases will not or could not have been aware of the 
risk in their environment.28 
4.4  damage arrangements as a basis for a balanced 
allocation of responsibilit y
Is there a problem with the way the responsibility for damage arrangements 
is now allocated? We can interpret this question narrowly to mean: does go-
vernment have a financial problem? Are the losses suffered by government 
such that we are justified in reallocating that responsibility? This is a political 
question that cannot be answered here. What we would like is to reframe the 
question regarding the current system of damage arrangements. Are all of the 
parties given sufficient incentives to prevent or at least limit damage as much 
as possible? And if damage occurs after all, are the necessary financial resour-
ces available to bear the losses involved? Government is in a position to take 
responsibility for the damage arrangements system.29 Our analysis of uncom-
pensated damage has shown that there are indeed parties to which government 
could allocate or with which it could share responsibility. At the same time, this 
particular line of action raises new challenges for government. 
It is not possible to come up with a general system of damage arrangements for 
the entire domain of physical safety (Faure and Hartlief 2002, 2006; Bruggeman 
2010). We need to find the right balance in each sector and policy area when 
allocating responsibility between the different parties, each of which could 
also play various different roles. For example, the sme sector in the chemicals 
industry is organised very differently than sectors typified by international 
production chains (food safety), fragmentation and complex hierarchies of con-
tractors and subcontractors (construction safety), or with more or less instituti-
onalised public-private mechanisms for damage arrangements (nuclear energy, 
animal diseases). The risks and uncertainties may also differ so much that ques-
tions related to insurability and insurance have to be addressed in very different 
ways. There is thus no general, one-size-fits-all solution. Nevertheless, there 
are three general questions that must always be asked, even though they may 
lead to a different answer in each context:
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–  How can trade and industry be held accountable? 
–  What can we expect of citizens? 
–  What role should government play? 
Each of these questions raises political and administrative issues and provides 
different reference points for reassessing the allocation of responsibility. It is 
also important to realise that choices made in one area may have consequences 
for another, for example for what is possible in terms of public support or poli-
tical feasibility. Deciding to tolerate ‘free riders’ in trade and industry is difficult 
to combine with the demands insurers make on citizens. The same goes for a 
relaxed regime of licensing, maintenance, supervision and enforcement, a bare-
bones system of social insurance and nonmandatory compensation, and liabi-
lity legislation that offers little comfort. The burden is then shifted unilaterally 
onto the innocent victims. On the other hand, if nonmandatory compensation 
is too generous, other parties will be disinclined to accept their share of the 
responsibility for damage arrangements. Measures that favour damage coverage 
will not necessarily provide the right incentives for preventing incidents and 
damage, managing risk and dealing proactively with uncertainty. 
4.4.1  Businesses taking responsibilit y for themselves and societ y
 Intrinsic motivation30 for  physical safety
Some sectors and individual businesses are intrinsically motivated to take res-
ponsibility for threats. The aviation sector is a prime example, and according 
to our interviewees, the same is true of the ‘chemicals giants’. In these sectors, 
a culture of safety goes hand in hand with generous damage arrangement po-
licies. They not only look at their own methods and systems, but also consider 
the circumstances (hazardous and uncertain) in which they operate. Other 
industries or sectors have made public-private arrangements for damage, for 
example in the livestock sector via its industry boards. In addition, there are in-
dustry organisations that act as platforms for providing information31 and coor-
dinating matters related to physical safety. Industries and sectors may be more 
proactive than government believes when it comes to thinking about risks and 
uncertainty. They are motivated by considerations of corporate social respon-
sibility and by concerns about business continuity or reputation. Examples 
include the Compendium of Construction Safety,32 drawn up by a broad range 
of representatives in the construction industry (Galjaard 2011), and the Safety 
First action plan drafted by Dutch trade union confederation vno-ncw and 
four industry organisations in the chemicals and petrochemicals industry. One 
example of industry self-regulation is the nen standards,33 developed (and fi-
nanced) by trade and industry. These can also play a role in public law, however, 
when they are inserted into legislation and regulations. That is what happened 
with the Dutch Buildings Decree and the associated general orders in council. 
63damage arrangements: a different perspective
nen standards have been produced for food safety, the environment, fire safety, 
hazardous substances, and nanotechnology. 
Uncertainty mechanisms could be designed to make more use of such intrinsic 
motivation for physical safety, and of the willingness shown by businesses and 
industries (and the resulting knowledge and expertise) (Chapter 3). 
External incentives
Unfortunately, not all of the businesses that operate in the Netherlands are 
intrinsically motivated. If we view matters from the perspective of damage 
coverage, then it becomes clear that the traditional ‘polluter pays’ principle and 
liability legislation do not offer either government or citizens enough assurance 
that their losses can be recovered from risk-bearing parties.34 Even the threat 
of liquidation and criminal proceedings is evidently not enough to cause some 
businesses to take responsibility for preventing incidents, limiting damage, 
managing risk, dealing proactively with uncertainty and introducing provisions 
to cover any damage that may arise. And it is the victims, and society in general, 
that pay the price. The quick scan of high-risk companies35 mentioned earlier (in 
Chapter 2) revealed that many businesses are unable to show compliance with 
current fire safety rules, despite the serious risks and uncertainties involved. 
Fire safety is a primary risk, because the first ones to be affected are the people 
who actually work in the business. Why should we then assume that such busi-
nesses will take responsibility for the broader context if there is no incentive to 
do so? And how can such free riders be persuaded or forced to make adequate 
arrangements for damage?36 
Insurers and lenders
Perhaps the financial sector can also play a role in this respect. Insurers and 
lenders have an interest in working with damage-free businesses, and it is 
disadvantageous for them to involve themselves in businesses that fail due to 
uncompensated damage. How can financial guarantees be aligned more closely 
with potential threats to physical safety and potential damage? Do insurers 
make enough use of the various options available to them (such as inspections, 
policy conditions and higher or lower insurance rates) to promote prevention, 
risk management and a proactive approach to uncertainty (Havinga 2010)? 
What role is there for the lenders, given that they often already impose damage 
and liability insurance obligations on borrowers? How can we help insurers 
promote physical safety as a public interest?37 Is it a good idea to impose a duty 
of care on them? Dutch legislation and regulations currently restrict the role 
of insurers in damage and liability insurance, for example owing to exempti-
ons under the Financial Supervision Act (wft). It seems as if the legislature 
optimistically assumed that such policies are relatively simple products and 
that businesses know enough to insure themselves adequately against major 
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risks. The duty of care could also be modelled on the German system, however. 
There, insurers (and insurance agents) are obliged by law to advise businesses 
on insured amounts and coverage. In other words, they must point out gaps 
in coverage. If businesses base themselves on that advice and suffer uncom-
pensated losses, then they can hold the insurer liable. This gives the insurance 
industry a very good reason to analyse risks and uncertainty proactively and to 
acquire the necessary expertise in that regard. Businesses, in turn, are obliged to 
inform insurers adequately about their activities.38 
Insurers have always tried to find a balance between safety and risks (Hartlief 
2009). They too are concerned about ‘new risks’ such as electromagnetic fields 
and nanotechnology. What more can they do to help weigh up opportunities 
and threats, both for individual businesses and in the political and public de-
bate?39 The financial sector could play a larger role as a partner in the proposals, 
initiatives and activities mentioned in Chapter 3. 
Costs and benefits
The responsibility for damage arrangements – in the double sense of covering 
damage on the one hand and preventing damage, managing risk and dealing 
proactively with uncertainty on the other – means that business costs may in-
crease.40 Those who question whether potential sources of damage should be 
held primarily responsible often use this economic disadvantage to back up their 
argument. It means, however, accepting that the responsibility is then shifted 
to citizens, other businesses and government. Another frequent argument is 
that high operational costs will be included in the price, and that the citizen, in 
the guise of the consumer, ultimately pays. But is that really so terrible? It could 
in fact be argued that consumers should help pay for safe production processes, 
rather than passing on the cost to the taxpayer, either directly or indirectly. For 
a trading nation such as the Netherlands, it will not only be the Dutch consu-
mer who foots the bill. And as we already argued in Chapter 3, Dutch trade and 
industry also benefits from a high level of physical safety and adequate damage 
arrangements. Here too, one has to spend money to make money. 
Potential victims
Businesses are not only potential sources of damage or partners in organising 
damage arrangements; they themselves can incur losses or benefit from such 
arrangements. Can businesses, as potential victims, be encouraged to take res-
ponsibility for their own losses? Which threats to physical safety should be 
regarded as a normal business risk that companies are responsible for themsel-
ves? Which risks are insurable or should be? And when are collective damage 
arrangements (private, public-private or public) necessary to ensure a healthy 
business climate? 
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In summary, the point is to hold trade and industry – both individual busines-
ses and sectors – accountable for themselves and for their responsibility to so-
ciety, in differing roles: 1) as a potential cause of damage, 2) as a potential victim 
and interested party in matters of damage arrangements and physical safety, 
and 3) as a facilitator regarding both of the aims of damage arrangements. 
4.4.2  the role of citizens
Citizens often have only a limited chance of avoiding or controlling threats to 
physical safety. They can be offered a modus operandus, however: they can be 
taught what to do to avoid or to minimise damage. One essential factor is to 
provide them with proper information about the risks in their environment 
and their insurance options. Organising drills can help them put the modus 
operandus into practice. At the moment, practical drills are often left to the 
professionals. Citizens are not involved and evacuation drills are in fact usually 
announced in advance so that there is no disruption to everyday life (“remain 
seated, this is only a drill”). In countries such as Japan and Singapore, it is more 
customary for people to learn how to cope with physical safety issues and re-
ceive training with respect to specific threats. People are more aware of what 
they are supposed to do. 
Citizens also come into focus as potential victims. The question then is whether 
they can insure themselves sufficiently and whether first party insurance is 
the best option. On the one hand, the idea that everyone must pay for their 
own damage – a basic principle that dates from the nineteenth century (see the 
wrr report Uncertain Safety for a more detailed discussion) – should motivate 
citizens to take responsibility for damage arrangements themselves. On the 
other, the law provides grounds to get other parties to pay for the damage. This 
is where the ‘polluter pays’ principle comes in. Victims must take the initiative 
to recover their losses from the source of the damage. That does not happen 
automatically. Experience shows that in cases of mass damage,41 the victims 
find very little financial consolation through tort law.42 As one of the aims 
of damage arrangements is damage coverage, this would be a good reason to 
emphasise first party insurance, in keeping with proposals made earlier in this 
chapter and as recommended by an independent advisory board on state disas-
ter compensation (Borghouts Committee 2004).43 At the same time, it would 
be unfair if making potential victims responsible for themselves also discou-
rages potential sources of damage from making adequate arrangements. The 
responsibilities expected of potential victims must be balanced by obligations 
imposed on high-risk industry. The demand for fairness – including situations 
in which there are geographical, social, economic and demographic differences 
(see Chapter 3) – must be addressed. 
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4.4.3  the role of government
Government plays several different roles when it comes to damage arrange-
ments. To begin with, it is responsible for the system of damage arrangements, 
because it is in a position to actively allocate responsibility within the system. 
The question is what government can do to get businesses and citizens to 
shoulder their responsibility, either by incentive or coercion. Second, by issuing 
permits and licences and taking charge of maintenance,44 enforcement and 
supervision, government is responsible for preventing incidents, avoiding da-
mage, managing risk and reducing uncertainty. It can be held accountable in the 
legal, ethical and political senses. Third, government plays a role as a safety net 
(through the social insurance system) and life buoy (through nonmandatory 
compensation). Finally, government is also involved in damage arrangements 
as a potential victim. For a balanced allocation of responsibility, it is important 
that these differing roles are properly coordinated and aligned with what is 
expected of businesses and citizens. 
Responsible for the system
In many cases, government is itself in a position to decide what should be 
considered ‘normal danger’ (and therefore as bad luck45 that victims must bear 
themselves) and what counts as a violation of physical safety for which a collec-
tive contribution to claims settlement would be desirable. Government can also 
share or delegate responsibility: it can obligate or induce citizens and trade and 
industry to take on certain responsibilities. That is how it bears responsibility 
for the system of damage arrangements. 
Whether businesses should be capable of bearing all the consequences of their 
actions (with the most extreme consequence being that a certain business 
does not wish to or cannot set up operations in the Netherlands), or whether 
reasonable provision is expected to be made for damage are ultimately political 
decisions. The same is true when considering whether citizens are deemed 
capable of bearing all their losses by themselves, or whether and to what extent 
solidarity is appropriate. Is government prepared to oblige or force potential 
victims to bear the responsibility for their own losses, for example by making 
first party insurance mandatory or by dismantling fundamental provisions for 
nonmandatory compensation? How can government encourage citizens and 
businesses to be ready and willing to accept and take more responsibility for 
physical safety?46
Government can obligate risk-bearing parties to make arrangements for da-
mage, for example by setting certain requirements in permits, making liability 
insurance mandatory,47 holding executives and shareholders liable, imposing 
administrative fines48 or forcing the parties to participate in a damage guarantee 
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fund.49 With regard to mandatory insurance, Belgium is the only country that 
has general mandatory liability insurance for businesses (Bruggeman 2010: 267-
269 ff; Akkermans and Brans 2002: 13). There are differences between countries 
that are worth exploring, however. For example, businesses in the pharmaceu-
tical industry in Germany must have liability insurance. In addition,50 govern-
ment can try to get trade and industry to internalise its sense of responsibility. 
Could an inspection regime based on trust51 help in this regard?52 According to 
Six (2011), it is important in combined regimes for government to make clear 
to businesses that they have a choice: their treatment will be the result of how 
they conduct themselves. That should encourage businesses to take responsibi-
lity voluntarily. 
Responsibility for issuing permits, maintenance, enforcement and supervision
Government is also responsible for issuing permits, for maintenance, for en-
forcement and for supervision. In that capacity, it too weighs up opportunities 
and threats and, as the party bearing operational responsibility, it must consider 
how to deal with uncertain dangers and damage (see Uncertain Safety for a 
more detailed discussion). 
Government’s permit, enforcement and supervision systems can induce, in-
spire or force potential sources of damage to display responsible behaviour and 
make arrangements for damage. The authorities can also take the relevant busi-
ness’s reputation into account when issuing permits. They can refuse to issue 
permits to a business that has a bad track record in physical safety or displays 
signs of free ridership, or it can make additional demands on damage arrange-
ments. Businesses that have a weak culture of safety and inadequate damage 
arrangements can be tackled more aggressively, in the knowledge that a liability 
claim will not, after all, provide any compensation if damage does arise (see also 
Chapter 2, which indicates that enforcement is often cited as the main problem 
in post-incident evaluations). 
Safety net and life buoy
The social insurance system functions as a safety net for the victims of damage 
that cannot be attributed to a particular cause. The provisions are basic, tied to 
standardised amounts, and victims are entitled to benefit, essentially regardless 
of the cause. In addition, government can throw victims another life buoy in 
the shape of nonmandatory compensation. In accordance with current prac-
tice, it uses this to compensate victims for part of their private losses in cases 
of serious damage in the physical safety domain. Even if society does not con-
sider this system problematical in financial terms, the question is whether the 
current practice of nonmandatory compensation provides other parties with 
enough incentives to take responsibility for preventing damage, managing risk 
and investigating uncertainty. 
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At the moment, many of the nonmandatory compensation schemes are spe-
cific, even unique. It seems advisable, then, to develop an overall strategy for 
nonmandatory compensation based on a set of principles, so that in the case of 
uncompensated damage, government need not give in immediately to the de-
mand for a generous compensation. If its gestures are overly generous, busines-
ses, insurers, lenders and citizens will not be encouraged to take responsibility 
themselves, make their own provisions and make a serious appraisal of the op-
portunities and threats. 
The most far-reaching option is to develop a fundamental, general framework 
for nonmandatory compensation.53 A general framework is not a goal in itself, 
but a means to provide clarity about what government will do. The other ex-
treme is to annul the wts and similar fundamental schemes, with only the 
social insurance system remaining as a basic safety net for victims. Government 
can also decide to make ad hoc arrangements, tailored to each specific situation, 
or – analogous to the foreign disaster relief provided via charitable organisations 
– help pay for the damage (matching donations).54 To avoid having to reinvent 
the wheel every time, with all the associated perverse impacts, we recommend 
defining a few basic principles for assessing specific initiatives involving non-
mandatory compensation. 
Government as a potential victim
As the custodian of public assets, government can also be involved in the dama-
ge arrangements system as a potential victim. If violations of physical safety lead 
to environmental pollution, to damage suffered by objects of cultural heritage, 
or to damaged infrastructure, public areas and buildings, then government must 
bear its ‘own’ losses, unless it can recover them. The limitations of the liability 
claims system, in the financial sense, apply in the case of government as well. 
It is therefore in government’s interest to have access to a system of damage 
arrangements that either prevents damage from occurring or ensures that it is 
sufficiently covered. This realisation is echoed in the letter that the Minister of 
Security and Justice, Ivo Opstelten, presented to the House of Representatives 
after the Moerdijk Chemicals Fire (2011). Because the company went into liqui-
dation, the clean-up costs had to be paid by local and central government: 
“What is most important is that Chemie-Pack must be regarded as the party res-
ponsible for the fire. As such, it is obliged to compensate for the costs associated 
with the disaster. The Government believes it is important to remind citizens and 
businesses not only of their rights but also of their obligations. This means that 
as much of the cost of the disaster will be recovered from the party responsible, 
Chemie-Pack, which has now gone into liquidation. We must not encourage a 
culture in which all eyes turn automatically to government to cover these sorts of 
clean-up costs.” 
69dammage arrangements: a different perspective
It is clear that fighting such a culture – a worry clearly expressed in the questi-
ons that the wrr was asked to consider – will also require government to arrive 
at a balanced system of damage arrangements in which there is a reallocation of 
responsibility, in part in its own interest as a potential victim.
4.5  conclusion
Physical safety is one of the core responsibilities of government, but gover-
nment cannot foot the bill for safety and damage on its own. The Minister’s 
request expresses government’s worry that it is playing far too great a role in 
damage compensation. We have noted that government comes into play as an 
actual or potential victim (in cases of public damage) and as a life buoy (non-
mandatory compensation; in addition, it also acts as a safety net for victims via 
the social insurance system). On the other hand, there are serious barriers to 
holding government liable for damage in connection with its responsibility for 
permits, enforcement and supervision. In that sense, liability is not a problem 
for government when viewed from the narrow (financial) perspective on da-
mage compensation. 
The reference points for trimming government’s role must be sought in a re-
duction in uncompensated damage. Government can effect that reduction by 
sharing and allocating responsibilities and organising incentives for better da-
mage coverage and for damage prevention and limitation. In the end, it can only 
legitimise its own financial contribution to damage compensation if it takes 
responsibility for the system of damage arrangements and if the other relevant 
parties also bear their share of the burden. 
This chapter argues that the concept of damage arrangements offers us a stra-
tegy for sharing and reallocating the responsibility for physical safety. Our pro-
posal is to reframe the question of the balanced allocation of responsibility in 
terms of good and best practices when dealing with damage. Government’s role 
in avoiding threats (i.e. the way it deals with risk and uncertainty) and in com-
pensating for violations of physical safety (i.e. the way it deals with incidents 
and damage) is part of this process. 
 
Based on the damage arrangements perspective, the allocation of responsibi-
lity for physical safety is balanced if 1) all the relevant parties are encouraged to 
prevent damage as much as possible, or at least to limit it, and 2) if the necessary 
financial resources are available to expedite damage control and management. 
Damage arrangements serve two purposes, then, but something that serves one 
purpose will not necessarily serve the other. That is why government requires a 
coherent strategic vision when it comes to sharing and allocating responsibility. 
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By unravelling the reasons for uncompensated damage (including problems of 
attribution, the ‘blood from a stone’ problem, and uninsurable and uninsured 
damage), we have been able to examine the political and administrative chal-
lenges and reference points and explore which parties have an interest in the 
damage arrangements system or are or could be involved in organising such 
arrangements. It is not possible to devise a general system of damage arran-
gements for the entire domain of physical safety. Segmentation is needed to 
create systems that can cover subdomains. The mechanisms will differ from 
one policy area, sector or type of threat to the next, but any thought given to a 
balanced system of damage arrangements will always come down to answering 
three interrelated questions: 
–  How can trade and industry be held accountable? 
– What can we expect of citizens? 
– What role should government play? 
It is important to recognise that citizens, trade and industry and government 
are and can all be involved in providing for damage in a variety of different rol-
es. The reflections set out in this chapter have led us to a number of conclusions. 
First of all, there is no avoiding the fact that risk-bearing businesses bear the 
primary responsibility. The problem of ‘getting blood from a stone’ illustrates 
that such businesses ought to play their part in damage prevention, risk ma-
nagement and dealing with uncertainty. A lecture after the fact about blame 
and liability is not sufficient. It is all too easy, misleading and in fact dangerous 
to view the primary responsibility of potential sources of damage purely as a 
matter of regulatory pressure. The discourse about the ‘risk-regulation reflex’ 
(Chapter 2) and ‘goldplating’ (Chapter 3) offers a strong inducement to do so, 
however. 
Businesses that accept their primary responsibility for physical safety, either 
owing to intrinsic motivation or external incentives, should not be unfairly 
disadvantaged as a result, for example due to unfair competition from busines-
ses that do not accept such responsibility. To ensure that responsible businesses 
operate on a level playing field, it is important to deal firmly with ‘free riders’ 
and see that they do accept primary responsibility for damage arrangements. 
That can easily be combined with an ‘honour system’ for businesses that de-
monstrate a sense of responsibility. But if politicians are reluctant to hold risk-
bearing businesses accountable in this way, either because they are afraid to do 
so or because they do not take the matter seriously enough, then government 
will end up paying a large chunk of the price for safety and for any damage that 
occurs. If that happens, it is unlikely that society will accept giving potential 
victims more responsibility for damage arrangements. 
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Second, it would be a pity if insurers and lenders were not actively involved 
both in contemplating the damage arrangements system (and in particular how 
to increase insurability) and in government initiatives and actions aimed at 
dealing with risk and uncertainty (see Chapter 3). The same is true for industry 
organisations and individual businesses that demonstrate intrinsic motivation. 
Insurers, lenders, intrinsically motivated and willing businesses and industry 
organisations could play a meaningful role both in appraising and in systemati-
cally intertwining opportunities and threats. 
Third, it is important to address, specifically, the important role that citizens 
could play in limiting (modus operandus) and covering (first party insurance) 
damage. The aim should be to prevent nonmandatory compensation from gi-
ving rise to perverse incentives. Potential and actual victims should also always 
be made aware of the limitations of liability legislation: in the end, very little 
compensation if any is ever awarded by invoking the law of torts. Potential 
victims should be aware that the notion that they should bear their own loss is 
not only an ancient legal principle but also an inconvenient truth, even though 
it conflicts with the ‘polluter pays’ principle. At the same time, it is difficult to 
imagine that the bill for damage should be footed solely by citizens. After all, 
they have very little control over threats to their physical safety and very lit-
tle chance of avoiding such threats. In any discussion of the contribution to be 
made by potential victims, it is important to address the issue of fairness. In 
order to create the necessary support in society for first-party insurance, and to 
avoid a situation in which it is only able to respond to a legitimate demand for 
fair play by offering nonmandatory compensation, government will not be able 
to avoid placing the primary responsibility for physical safety squarely at the 
feet of risk-bearing parties. 
Finally, government’s responsibility for the damage arrangements system and 
for permits, maintenance, enforcement and supervision should be much more 
central to the way we think about its responsibility for physical safety. This 
means paying more attention to how those responsibilities can be met, so that 
government can eventually curtail its role in compensating public damage 
and acting as a safety net and life buoy. As a potential victim of public damage 
and uncompensated losses to society, government also has a vested interest in 
damage arrangements. Such arrangements deserve a spot on the political and 
administrative agenda not only because physical safety is one of government’s 
core tasks, but also because government’s own interests are at stake. 
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notes
1  The Council for the Environment and Infrastructure (2011) has also drawn attention to 
damage arrangements. 
2  This issue has been recognised and is a point of discussion in ‘disaster-prone’ coun-
tries such as Australia. 
3  The history of the Netherlands’ external safety policy begins in around 1800. See Ale 
(2003) for a detailed historical survey up to the early twenty-first century.
4  Den Ouden and Tjepkema (2006) say that “in everyday language, legislative practice 
and case law ... terms such as allowance, benefit, income provision, contribution, 
compensation, damages, funding, aid and subsidies are not always used consistently 
and sometimes even entirely incorrectly” (p. 4). Den Ouden and Tjepkema argue that 
applying the wrong term for a nonmandatory financial payment, either in error or 
consciously, can give rise to all sorts of practical and legal problems. 
5  For example overflowing rivers, collapsing dikes, earthquakes and heavy precipitation. 
In essence, no one is to blame for such disasters.
6  The wts, which is funded entirely from the public purse, compensates victims only 
for uninsurable and irrecoverable damage (in other words, it does not provide full 
compensation). The amounts paid out are standard and there is an ‘own-risk’ element.
7  In 2004, the ctrc (also known as the Borghouts Committee) argued in favour of 
expanding and revamping the wts into a national solidarity fund in order to arrive at 
a “consistent and practical government safety net” in the domain of physical safety. 
That recommendation has so far not been followed. 
8  See the ctrc (2004) for a detailed discussion. See also Hartlief (2002), Akkermans and 
Brans (2002) and Ammerlaan (2009). 
9  See the letter by the Ministry of Security and Justice (16 September 2011) (House of 
Representatives, 2010-2011, 26 956, No. 112). 
10  This final example shows that damage settlement has the potential to lead to inter-
governmental conflicts. The fire department and municipal authorities appeared to be 
in default; other authorities, such as the water boards, had run up a bill amounting to 
millions of euros; and at first it seemed as if the national government wanted no part 
of it, except for promising, only days after the incident, to pay farmers nonmandatory 
compensation. It could have come down to one government authority taking the other 
to court. 
11  The scheme was a response to deficiencies in tort law (including problems of evidence 
and prescription, lapse of time). The trade unions and employers’ associations and the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment also joined together in setting up the As-
bestos Victims Institute, which mediates between employers and employees in order 
to reach agreements. 
12  The wrr is currently working on a report concerning “trusting in the citizen”, in 
which it considers how people, once they are properly equipped and are facing a chal-
lenge, are quick to organise themselves today using the social media when they want 
government to do something for them. 
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13  Giesen and Van Boom 2001; Akkermans and Brans 2002; Muller and Stolker 2001; 
Spier 2002; Gundelach and Michiels 2003; De Mot 2001; Van Rossum 2005; Ammer-
laan 2009; Bruggeman 2010.
14  The question is whether discussions of the future of the social insurance system make 
enough allowance for the fact that the system also provides for people affected by 
incidents and damage in the domain of physical safety. 
15  Motorists in the Netherlands are required to take out liability insurance (many people 
do not seem to realise that the obligation only applies in that context; they take out 
general liability insurance anyway, which is then referred to in everyday language as 
‘third-party insurance’ (wa-verzekering). The insured amount under such private 
policies is between eur 1 and 2.5 million. Viewed within this context, the average 
amount for which high-risk small and medium-sized businesses insure themselves 
can be considered on the low side. 
16  Policy holders insure themselves against losses suffered by third parties owing to an 
act or omission on the policy holder’s part. This includes liability insurance policies. 
17  Policy holders insure themselves against their own losses. Examples of first-party 
insurance relevant within the context of physical safety risks are brick and mortar in-
surance, fire and theft insurance, occupational disability insurance, and motor vehicle 
insurance. 
18  Before then, insurance did cover flooding. 
19  There are also countries – Belgium and France being two examples – in which the 
risk of flooding is insurable without government intervention, i.e. as a mandatory 
surcharge on brick and mortar insurance (which is basically voluntary). Flood insur-
ance is also available at low rates in several developing countries (the amounts paid out 
are standardised). It is striking how few foreign insurance companies are active in the 
Dutch insurance market. It is possible for individuals and businesses abroad to insure 
themselves against damage in the Netherlands, but that scarcely ever occurs. Research 
into the reasons is beyond the remit of this document.
20  As far as we know, there are no official discussions between insurers and government 
about insurability and other insurance issues related to physical safety and security.
21  A further consideration is whether the increasingly stringent supervisory regime, 
specifically the requirement of financial solvency, is forcing insurers to cease insuring 
threats to physical safety, even if they would prefer to do so. 
22  Letter from the Minister of Finance to the House of Representatives, 20 April 2011. 
Schedule to the Proceedings, 2010-2011, No. 2307.
23  Other major business liability insurance packages are taken out through the insurance 
exchange (www.vnab.nl), as concerns about its own solvency would prevent a single 
insurer from bearing the risk alone. The exchange allows businesses to seek out part-
ners. The insurance is thus provided by multiple insurers, and if losses are incurred, 
each pays out in proportion to its stake.
24  Based on Article 18 of the Nuclear Accidents Liability Act (wako). 
25  Insurers, in their turn, depend on the opinions of reinsurers when determining the 
risks that they want to insure. 
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26  See House Documents 28915 Nos. 1 to 3 for a description of the role of government in 
the nht. See also Ammerlaan and Van Boom (2003). 
27  Is government willing and able to encourage citizens to take out coverage for damage 
in the domain of physical safety, for example following the example of France? This is 
what Faure and Hartlief (2006a, b) and the ctrc (2004) argue it should do. 
28  Communication about violations of physical safety is a separate matter that we will 
not address further in this document. We find it important to state, however, that if 
there are wishes, expectations or desires concerning the role to be played by potential 
victims, then they must be appropriately informed about the risks and uncertainties 
affecting them. See for example the study by Meijer (2004; 2005) on the use of risk 
maps on the Internet. Citizens make very limited use of the maps; they look at the 
information but do not respond (no ‘exit’ or ‘voice’). Other stakeholders (property 
agents, businesses, the media) view the maps but do not exercise social control. An-
other point of debate is the fear that terrorists will make use of the risk maps. Open-
ness has caused local authorities and businesses to be more concerned about their 
reputation (and to prepare disaster plans): they act as if citizens and other parties make 
use of the information and feel as if they are being ‘watched’. Meijer’s study suggests 
that the risk maps are an incentive, but not in the manner originally intended. See: 
http://www.risicokaart.nl/. Here too, international comparison could unearth inter-
esting policy options. In France, for example, home owners are obligated to hand over 
a risk map when selling their property.
29  See the wrr’s report on iGovernment (2011) for another take on the notion of system 
responsibility within the context of iSecurity. See also: De Hert (2011). In a recent 
report, the Royal Academy (2011) has also drawn attention to government’s responsi-
bility for the system within the context of physical safety. 
30  See Tyler 2010.
31  That means that businesses do not need to acquire knowledge and expertise on risks 
and uncertainties on their own. Their industry organisations can help them find ways 
to prevent accidents, limit damage, manage risks and deal proactively with uncertain-
ty. 
32  http://www.betonvereniging.nl/ 
33  www.nen.nl; see also http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/certificeren-
keuren-en-meten/normalisatie/nederlands-normalisatie-instituut-nen 
34  In Uncertain Safety, the wrr (2008) explicitly recommended imposing obliga-
tions on risk-bearing parties in order to augment the financial guarantees. A similar 
recommendation had already been made by the ctrc (2004), which said that it was 
necessary either to establish better payment guarantees for damage compensation 
or to reduce the risk of liability attaching to an insolvent party. The aim is to prevent 
any damage from putting undue pressure on public finances, to encourage the serious 
appraisal of opportunities and threats, and to promote prevention, preparation and a 
proactive approach to uncertainty. The main aim in Uncertain Safety was to creative 
incentives that would get businesses to take responsibility for the risks and uncer-
tainties associated with their activities. A further aim was to get other parties, such 
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as insurers and lenders, to involve themselves in weighing up the opportunities and 
threats. Although the Dutch Government looked favourably on this recommendation, 
there has been no follow-up so far. That is why the wrr has chosen to reconsider the 
earlier recommendation, in the hope that it can draw attention to damage arrange-
ments policy among politicians and public administrators.
35  See the letters by the Dutch State Secretary of Infrastructure and Environment, Joop 
Atsma, concerning high-risk businesses (and inspections of those businesses) after 
the fire at the Chemie-Pack plant in Moerdijk (18 March and 14 July 2011).
36  The quick scan also reveals that many businesses running serious physical safety risks 
are not members of an industry organisation. Government should join with industry 
organisations and businesses to explore how risk-bearing businesses can be induced 
to become members, given how proactively such organisations are attempting to take 
responsibility and the role that they can play in providing information and coordinat-
ing matters in the domain of physical safety.
37  Is competition law hampering them too much in this public role? And if so, how can 
the necessary scope be created for them? See also the wrr report (still pending) on 
securing public interest in markets. 
38  Correspondence with Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft e.V., 
the German sister organisation of the Dutch Association of Insurers (Verbond van 
Verzekeraars). 
39  In the uk, government and insurers are said to be collaborating on a joint strategic vi-
sion concerning insurers’ role in society. Because we obtained this information only in 
the final phases of writing this report, we have not been able to check it.
40  There are also benefits associated with an investment in safety that transcend the 
costs. 
41  See section 4.2. See also Havinga (2010) for lessons learned taking the liability route in 
the domain of food safety. 
42  Victims also have other reasons or motivations for holding a source of damage liable. 
They may want redress, recognition, an apology, accountability; their aim might be to 
reveal the truth or to be treated fairly before the law (see also Chapter 2). See also Van 
Maanen (2003) and Huver et al. (2007).
43  The recommendation was: “people and businesses should arrange better protection 
for themselves against the financial consequences of disasters”. According to the Com-
mittee, that means making threats that are presently uninsurable, insurable and by 
limiting the extent to which insurable risks are not insured or underinsured, for exam-
ple by urging first-party insurance. 
44  When a threat to physical safety is related to natural causes, government’s role in 
damage arrangements also becomes clear in its direct or indirect responsibility for 
maintaining protective infrastructure, such as dikes. Maintenance also plays a role in 
infrastructure and in limiting damage in public areas, buildings and items of cultural 
and historical value. 
45  Even if blame can be attributed but the losses cannot be recovered. 
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46  See also the wrr’s report on promoting public interests, due to be published in 
early 2012.
47  Liability insurance is compulsory in the Netherlands only for motorists, nuclear power 
plants, oil tankers, medical research involving human subjects (not only businesses 
but also universities and other research institutions) and hunters. Businesses do take 
out liability insurance for other reasons, for example because they are required to do 
so under a permit or because the bank financing them demands it. It is conceivable that 
a business may want more substantial liability coverage after appraising its risks, but 
that the statutory obligation acts as a perverse incentive, causing it to insure itself only 
for the minimum amount. 
48  Such administrative fines already do exist in Germany, Belgium and the United King-
dom. 
49  Businesses could unite in a guarantee fund covering ‘damage to society’, and separate 
industry or an umbrella guarantee fund for physical safety, so that they can organise 
damage arrangements that they would not be able to provide separately. A damage 
guarantee fund could force members to manage risks and investigate uncertainty un-
der penalty of exclusion. A damage guarantee fund could require its members to in-
sure themselves against liability for a minimum amount, or set solvency requirements. 
These are ways in which trade and industry can itself organise and internalise notions 
of safety and reasonable damage arrangements. 
50  It is easy enough to make this an ‘either-or’ choice, but it could also be postulated as 
‘and-and’, with the initial strategy focusing on free riders and the second on intrinsi-
cally motivated and willing parties.
51  Such as enforcement agreements in the transport and traffic sector and the ‘inspection 
holidays’ included in the Business Regulatory Burden Reduction Programme (2011-
2015). An inspection holiday means that inspections are not carried out unless there 
are counter-indications. This is presented as a reward for good behaviour. 
52  As mentioned, this is what the ctrc argues (ctrc 2004). 
53  Not – or not only – to save money, but also to demonstrate public support for nonman-
datory compensation and the effects that it could have on citizens’ awareness of their 
own responsibility for damage. In this scenario, nonmandatory compensation is not 
offered automatically, but it is transparent. 
54  See the letter by the Minister of Security and Justice (16 September 2011) (House of 
Representatives, 2010-2011, 26 956, No. 112).
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5 conclusions
5.1  difficult questions
How can government take responsibility for physical safety in accordance with 
its statutory obligations and the need for collective mechanisms, and at the 
same time ensure that citizens and businesses also assume their share of the 
responsibility (and are capable of doing so)? What can and should we expect of 
citizens and businesses, and what should government do? 
There are no easy answers to these difficult questions. We have nevertheless at-
tempted to provide a scientifically informed answer to the questions presented 
to us. These questions are the following:
–  Are there reference points for dismantling existing mechanisms and breaking 
through  barriers associated with both the risk-regulation reflex and the reflex 
in which the responsibility is laid squarely at the feet of government?
–  How can government develop a general risk policy in which it plays a smaller 
role in avoiding and compensating for risks?
5.2  key concepts: incidents, damage, risks and uncertaint y
In this document, we stress the importance of distinguishing between risks 
(sufficiently known and undisputed dangers), uncertainty (dangers that typi-
cally involve faulty knowledge and/or conflicting values), incidents (dealing 
with actual violations of physical safety) and damage (dealing with the conse-
quences of such violations). Risks and uncertainty are points on a continuum. 
The distinction is a gradual one and controversy can easily arise as to whether 
the danger in question is in fact sufficiently known and undisputed to be calcu-
lated as a function of probability and impact. 
Incidents, damage, uncertainty and risks are therefore differing dimensions of 
physical safety. Each dimension raises other political and administrative issues, 
but the way we deal with each one influences the way we deal with the others. 
The potential advantages and disadvantages must therefore be viewed both se-
parately and in relation to one another. It is an intricate balancing act to allocate 
responsibilities in a way that prevents incidents, limits and covers damage, and 
manages risks and uncertainty as effectively as possible. 
5.3  beyond reflexes 
In Chapter 2, we argued that the discourse about the risk-regulation reflex in 
fact centres on political and administrative conduct (or misconduct) after an 
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incident occurs. That is why we prefer the term ‘incident-regulation reflex’. 
We concluded that this reflex is perceived to be real, but that there is also a lack 
of solid evidence for its existence. There has been very little in-depth empirical 
research into the political and administrative follow-up to incidents. There are 
indications, but the evidence tends to be anecdotal. And there are also counter-
indications. The question is which examples should be taken seriously. Which 
ones are exceptions, and which ones are representative? Do incidents consis-
tently result in overreactions and excessive rules and regulations, as assumed 
in the debate concerning the incident reflex? Or is there another pattern visible 
in the way incidents are actually dealt with, at least in the domain of physical 
safety? Does the initial commotion perhaps die down? Since there is no valid 
evidence based on empirical research, the incident reflex remains, at least for 
the time being, a hypothesis that has yet to be tested. We can imagine alterna-
tive hypotheses that can explain why perceived reality co-exists with a lack of 
solid evidence (see Chapter 2).
The question, then, is whether we have enough grounds for taking the presu-
med regulation reflex as the starting point for thinking about the responsibility 
for physical safety. In addition, taking the incident reflex as our underlying 
assumption means that we must find evidence of ‘bad’ or at least deficient 
governance. We propose tilting that perspective towards encouraging ‘good’ 
governance. 
Thinking in terms of the incident-regulation reflex puts unilateral emphasis 
on preventing incident-driven policy. By tilting the perspective, we shift the 
emphasis from the reason (the incidents) to good governance in incidents, the 
purpose of policy (physical safety) and the way in which the associated respon-
sibilities can be allocated. The focal point is thus shifted from reacting retroac-
tively to actual violations of physical safety to thinking ahead about potential 
threats to physical safety. As a result, risks and uncertainty take centre stage as 
we examine the responsibility for physical safety (and government’s role in that 
context). 
Our reflections have not produced a specific roadmap for promoting good go-
vernance in incidents, but we have suggested three routes that can help politi-
cians, public administrators and public servants do so themselves: 1) study the 
follow-up to incidents (within the social sciences), 2) systematically mine 
the political and administrative lessons learned and 3) overcome a reluctance to 
admit to the limits of their power and to their own grasp of reality by allowing 
for citizens’ actual expectations in their modus operandus. 
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The Minister’s questions show that government is concerned about high (or 
excessive) costs. It should be noted, however, that no thorough study has 
been made of citizens’ expectations and the role that they believe government 
should play. There is no solid empirical evidence that citizens ‘automatically 
hold government responsible’. Perhaps government is anticipating something 
that is only an assumption. Nevertheless, in order to address the idea that the 
responsibility for compensating violations of physical safety is laid automa-
tically and unilaterally at the feet of government, we considered the role that 
government plays in damage settlement practices in Chapter 4. 
Government enters the picture when someone is needed to foot the bill for ir-
recoverable public damage and uncompensated damage suffered by citizens and 
businesses. Government pays for its ‘own’ damage and throws citizens and/
or businesses a life buoy that is known as ‘nonmandatory compensation’. The 
shock to government finances is not that government will be held liable (indi-
rectly) because of its role in issuing permits, enforcement or deficient supervi-
sion of the source of damage (the primary source). There are in fact high legal 
barriers to such liability. The shock is in the uncompensated damage. Damage 
may be uncompensated owing to problems of attribution, recoverability (‘get-
ting blood from a stone’), because it is uninsurable or uninsured and beyond the 
victims’ capacity to bear or their sense of fair play. 
5.4  is a general policy possible? 
The outgoing Government believes that the allocation of responsibility that 
has evolved in the domain of physical safety should be reassessed. Would it 
be possible to develop a general policy in that domain that can be used to shift 
the allocation of responsibility? How can government ensure that 1) it does not 
take on more responsibility than necessary and 2) other parties are given or take 
more responsibility? We believe that the allocation of responsibility is balanced 
when 1) all the parties are encouraged to prevent or limit damage as much as 
possible, and 2) there are sufficient financial resources to cover the damage. We 
have considered options for developing a general policy that reallocates respon-
sibility – i.e. trims government’s role – by identifying a set of basic principles for 
dealing with risks and uncertainty (Chapter 3) and by considering the allocation 
of responsibility from the perspective of damage arrangements (Chapter 4). 
 
5.4.1  reference points for dealing with risks and uncertaint y
We have arrived at five reference points for dealing with potential threats across 
the entire spectrum of risks and uncertainty: 1) intertwine opportunities and 
threats; 2) make allowance for the social and psychological properties of dan-
ger; 3) utilise risk comparisons in order to ease the political appraisal process; 
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4) accept uncertainty (and the responsibility for uncertainty); 5) organise how 
uncertainty is dealt with. In Chapter 3, we used the National Risk Assessment 
(nra) and the amendment of environment and planning legislation (the 
Simply Better operation) to explore how these five reference points can be used 
in policymaking. They offer opportunities to boost and improve the nra (draw 
attention to opportunities, multidimensional risk comparison, an Uncertainty 
Agenda) so that politicians can more easily make their way through what they 
consider an avalanche of potential threats to physical safety. The mental exer-
cise related to Simply Better addressed the export value of physical safety and 
the value of risk regulation as a form of knowledge transfer (and thus as a means 
to lighten the burden for trade and industry), as well as the potential role of 
duties of care, open standards and the duty of risk-bearing parties to investigate 
uncertainty. 
We believe that working with these general reference points in specific policy-
making can help government develop a clearer view of the matters for which 
and the levels at which it should take responsibility or in fact hold others res-
ponsible. It will then find itself facing fewer ‘orphan’ responsibilities that no 
one wants to accept, leaving it with unexpected claims and uncompensated 
damage. Risk management and a sensible approach to uncertainty should ideal-
ly allow government to deal self-confidently with incidents and damage. After 
all, thinking in terms of risk and uncertainty implies recognising that physical 
safety will in fact be violated at some point. 
5.4.2  damage arrangements: a different perspective on the alloca-
tion of responsibilit y
The conceptual discourse concerning the responsibility for physical safety has 
wrongly neglected the topic of damage arrangements. Damage arrangements 
do, however, offer reference points for reallocating responsibility. Reframing 
matters by considering potential future damage can help us ascertain which 
parties are and should be held responsible. 
Whether the price that government now pays for uncompensated damage is 
too high is a political question. What is in any event more relevant is to ask 
whether the current practice of damage arrangements offers parties enough in-
centives to actually take responsibility for physical damage. Anyone analysing 
the many-headed monster of uncompensated damage (Chapter 4) will discover 
that there are indeed parties to which government could allocate or with which 
it could share responsibility. Recoverability, insurability/uninsurability and 
underinsured risk offer reference points for reallocating responsibilities so that 
there is less pressure on public finances. 
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Damage arrangements serve two purposes. They not only cover loss but also 
offer incentives to prevent incidents, limit damage, manage risks and inves-
tigate uncertainty. This would reduce the risk of violations of physical safety 
leading to damage. The problem of uncompensated damage can also be tackled 
along the same route, with both improvements in safety and a smaller financial 
role for government becoming possible. 
We do not consider it possible to devise a general system of damage arrange-
ments for the entire domain of physical safety. The sectors and policy areas 
differ too much for that. Even though the answers will differ from one segment 
to the next, then, the questions that should be asked are the same: 
– How can trade and industry be held accountable?
– What can we expect of citizens?
– What role should government play?
Government is in a position to take responsibility for the system of damage 
arrangements because it is the only party that can take, share or allocate the 
relevant responsibilities. Its role in issuing permits and in enforcement and 
supervision is of central importance here, precisely because too often, an appeal 
to tort law offers little comfort when damage arises.
The current allocation of responsibility makes it inevitable that the primary 
responsibility for damage should be placed more definitely at the feet of risk-
bearing businesses, in particular owing to the problem of irrecoverable damage 
and with a view to generating the necessary public support for making potential 
victims responsible for damage arrangements. It is important to tackle free 
riders precisely because there are businesses that take their primary respon-
sibility seriously. Strictness can easily be combined with an ‘honour system’ 
regime for businesses that are intrinsically motivated and show willingness. 
Insurers, lenders, industry or sector organisations and intrinsically motivated 
businesses could be more actively involved in organising the system of damage 
arrangements and in weighing up opportunities and threats. Citizens can also 
make a contribution to damage arrangements, even though they usually have 
little realistic opportunity to avoid risk. The chance of gaining compensation 
by holding parties liable is small, and the limits to government’s provision of 
nonmandatory compensation mean that they must take responsibility for any 
losses they might suffer themselves. 
Government’s responsibility for the system also requires it to perform a balan-
cing act. We outlined a number of options that could help it arrive at a balanced 
allocation of responsibility: imposing a duty of care on insurers, encouraging 
citizens and businesses to take out first-party insurance, public-private damage 
arrangement structures, drills so that citizens can practise what to do, obliga-
ting risk-bearing parties to compensate for damage and internalise their own 
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responsibility, setting up a damage guarantee fund for physical safety, increa-
sing the insurability of risks in the environment and developing a general view-
point on nonmandatory compensation. Our aim was to get politicians and pu-
blic administrators to focus on the process of organising damage arrangements 
as an important basis for reassessing the existing allocation of responsibility.
5.5  top three on the list of priorit y studies
We have not been able to carry out all the research necessary to study the classic 
question concerning the allocation of responsibility in the domain of physical 
safety. We will therefore conclude this document by listing what we consider 
the top three interdisciplinary studies on our list of priority social science re-
search. Their results should help to take the following steps.
Chapter 2: systematically investigate whether and how lessons have been le-
arned from incidents and whether, and if so, how the incidents led to 
legislation and regulations or to other policy interventions – or if not, 
why not – and what the impacts have been. This would provide reference 
points for considering the mechanisms relevant for dealing with incidents 
within the political and administrative context. 
Chapter 3: investigate uncertainty mechanisms. What settings are conducive 
to reflection, investigation and dialogue about faulty knowledge and 
conflicting values? Which factors lead to success, and which to failure? 
What are the underlying prerequisites? What can we learn about the role 
of the differing parties, i.e. citizens, businesses, industry organisations, 
insurers, lenders, experts, politicians, public servants? That would give us 
useful reference points for organising our approach to uncertainty (or  
improving that approach). 
Chapter 4: international comparison of national damage arrangements (liability 
and insurance regimes)1. Faure and Hartlief (2006a, b) have made a start, 
but their study dates from 2006. Bruggeman offers in-depth research, 
but her thesis does not cover all of Europe. Reinsurer Swiss Re (2011) re-
cently reviewed public-private partnerships in insurance arrangements 
(including in the usa, Mexico, China and Malawi). Even so, there is as yet 
no systematic comparative survey (law and economics) of eu countries. 
Important questions in such a survey are as follows: What regimes in fact 
ensure that responsibility is effectively allocated to citizens and busines-
ses, so that better provision is made for damage while safety improves at 
the same time? How do the various compensation mechanisms (insu-
rance, liability, state compensation funds) relate to one another, and how 
does this relationship compare to that in other countries? Such a survey 
would offer additional reference points and specific options for organising 
damage arrangements. 
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5.6  final remarks
Government will continue to struggle with a difficult and often troubling pro-
cess of appraisal that pits opportunities against threats, the short term against 
the long term, individual responsibility against fairness, and safety as a public 
interest against the individual freedom to act. Physical safety is not just a core 
task of government; government also has a direct (as potential victim) and in-
direct (as safety net and life buoy) interest in a high level of physical safety. It is 
very demanding to take responsibility for the system and allocate responsibili-
ties coherently to businesses, citizens and government for preventing, limiting 
and covering damage (and thus for preventing incidents, managing risks and 
reducing uncertainty as much as possible). We hope that our thoughts and re-
flections will help it perform this intricate balancing act. 
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note
1  Although there have been comparative law studies (Faure and Hartlief 2006a, b), a 
systematic review of relevant eu Member States’ damage arrangements would be 
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T H E  N E T H E R L A N D S  S C I E N T I F I C  C O U N C I L  F O R  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y
Physical Safety
Physical safety is a core task of government. It is neither surprising nor unreasonable 
for government to be held accountable for hazardous substances, for food safety, for 
flood protection, for the spread of infectious diseases, or for the risks involved in new 
technologies. 
In 2011 the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations asked the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (wrr) to investigate the scope for the development 
of a generic risk policy in relation to physical safety. Do citizens and businesses take 
sufficient responsibility for physical safety? Could the government assume a smaller 
role, and what part could the business community play in this? 
  
In this report the wrr argues that in order to answer these questions a distinction 
needs to be made between incidents, damage, risk and uncertainty. In addition, the 
wrr recommends that the thinking about responsibility for safety should not be 
placed in the perspective of a failing government, but that the central focus should be 
on the ambition of good governance. Finally, the wrr suggests that thinking about 
safety from the perspective of damage offers a useful framework for thinking through 
and reassessing the distribution of responsibilities. Responsibility for preventing, 
limiting and dealing with damage can only be assigned in advance, not retrospectively. 
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